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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the impact of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
(FASA) of 1994 and the Clinger-Cohen Act on cost overruns in Department of Defense 
(DoD) contracts.  Many officials believe that we must change the way we do business to 
meet the new post-Cold War national security challenges.  Changing the way we do 
business means reforming the acquisition process to deliver weapons systems faster and 
cheaper.  The FASA and the Clinger-Cohen Act made more changes to the acquisition 
process than any other policy had in the ten years preceding. 
This research effort studied 220 contracts completed between December 31, 1993 
and December 31, 2001 to determine if cost overruns on contracts completed before the 
implementation of the FASA and the Clinger-Cohen Act were different than cost 
overruns on contracts completed after the implementation of the FASA and the Clinger-
Cohen Act.  The contracts were also subdivided to determine if the results were sensitive 
to acquisition lifecycle phase, branch of service, or contract type. 
The results indicate that cost overruns decreased on completed contracts after the 
implementation of the legislation.  The results were sensitive to the branch of service 
responsible.  Air Force contracts experienced no change in cost overruns after the 
implementation of the FASA and the Clinger-Cohen Act, while cost overruns in Army 
and Navy contracts decreased.  The results were not sensitive to lifecycle phase or 
contract type. 
 
 
 
 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION STREAMLINING ACT AND 
THE CLINGER-COHEN ACT AND THEIR EFFECT ON COST OVERRUNS IN 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTS 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
General Issue 
September 11, 2001 is a day that will not soon be forgotten.  In a single hostile act 
against the United States, terrorists changed the world as we know it.  In 1994, Colleen 
Preston made a statement that the post-Cold War era introduced new political, economic, 
and military security challenges to the United States.  In order to meet these challenges, a 
change in the way we do business is necessary (Preston, 1994:7).  That statement has 
even more impact now than it did in 1994. 
Since we know that change must occur, the obvious question is what must 
change?  The 2002 budget for government spending is more than $2 trillion, of which 
$336 billion is allocated for defense (OMB, 2003: Table S-2).  This is more than 16% of 
the overall budget.  In order to ensure that this money is spent in the most effective 
manner, certain controls are in place.  These controls influence the current acquisition 
process, which protects taxpayers from fraud, waste, and abuse.  Since the acquisition 
process is central to how the government does business, one is led to believe that 
changing the way the government does business means changing the acquisition process.  
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General Lester Lyles, Commander of Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) commented 
on change and the acquisition process. 
Organizations and people either adapt to changing environments and move 
forward, or they become ineffective . . . We must make the cultural 
changes required to be successful.  We must continue to deliver 
tomorrow’s technologies in today’s weapon systems, faster, cheaper, and 
better (Lyles, 2002). 
 
This research looks at how we have changed the acquisition process in order “to 
deliver tomorrow’s technologies . . . cheaper.”  With the Department of Defense (DoD) 
activities using such a large share of the federal budget, it is easy to understand why cost 
performance is a major concern to those who are interested in reforming the acquisition 
process.  Delivering weapon systems to the Warfighter in an affordable manner is no easy 
task, but it is something we must do in order to meet the challenges of the future. 
Specific Issue  
On October 13, 1994, President Clinton signed into law the Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act (FASA), which was a result of Vice President Gore’s National 
Performance Review.  Another piece of legislation, the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, was 
the result of two additional acts, the Federal Acquisition Reform Act and the Information 
Technology Management Reform Act (DSMC web site).  These two acts are among the 
myriads of legislative actions aimed at improving the way the federal government does 
business. 
A major concern in the area of cost performance is the ability to stay within 
budget, avoiding cost overruns.  Cost overruns are defined as the difference between a 
contract’s actual costs at completion and the budgeted costs.  The effect the FASA and 
 
 3
the Clinger-Cohen Act have had on controlling cost overruns among defense contracts is 
still unclear.  The focus of this research is to quantify this effect and determine if the cost 
overrun percentage has increased, decreased, or remained the same. 
Scope and Limitations of Study 
The Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) database is a collection of 
earned value data for individual contracts on defense acquisition programs from 1970 to 
2002.  Since it captures all the data required to measure the fiscal health of a defense 
acquisition program, it will be used in this research for the purpose of analyzing cost 
overruns.  Past research has looked at other acquisition reform initiatives and their 
subsequent effect on cost overruns.  These research efforts will be summarized in Chapter 
2.  In order to center this effort on the acquisition initiatives in question, this research will 
be limited to those contracts that were completed between January 1, 1994 and December 
31, 2001.  Contracts completed before the pivotal date of December 31, 1997 will be 
compared to contracts completed after the pivotal date.  
Additionally, this study focuses on those defense programs engaged in the System 
Development and Demonstration phase and the Production and Deployment phase of the 
acquisition life cycle (See Figure 1 below).  Programs in the development phase will be 
compared to programs in the production phase to determine if there is a significant 
statistical difference in the respective cost overruns resulting from the enacted acquisition 
reform legislation.  Programs in other phases of the acquisition life cycle will not be 
addressed. 
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Figure 1. DoD 5000 Model (OSD Website) 
Finally, this research addresses only those programs that experienced cost 
overruns not cost growth.  Cost growth occurs when a program experiences valid changes 
that increase costs over the course of the procurement process.  It is assumed for the 
purpose of this study that all changes to the baseline are valid.  Thus, the final budget will 
be taken at face value for the purpose of analyzing cost overruns. 
Research Questions and Methodology 
  This research benefits the DoD by providing senior leadership with analytical, 
quantitative insight into the cost overrun problem and how it has changed as a result of 
specific legislation enacted to reform the acquisition process.  For the full benefit to be 
realized, it is important that key research questions are established.  The research 
questions addressed by this study are as follows: 
1. Is the final cost overrun percentage on contracts completed before the 
implementation of the FASA and Clinger-Cohen Act equal to the final cost 
overrun percentage on contracts completed after the implementation of the FASA 
and Clinger-Cohen Act? 
2. Is the final cost overrun percentage sensitive to the phase of the acquisition life 
cycle the program is in? 
3. Is the final cost overrun percentage sensitive to the branch of service responsible 
for the program? 
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4. Is the final cost overrun percentage sensitive to the type of contract? 
To make a conclusion about whether or not the DoD is performing better, worse, 
or the same in the area of cost overruns, hypothesis testing procedures are used to 
determine if the differences are statistically significant.  Specifically, the research 
hypotheses to be tested are 
H1: The mean final cost overrun percentage on contracts completed before the 
implementation of the FASA and Clinger-Cohen Act is not equal to the mean 
final cost overrun percentage on contracts completed after the implementation of 
the FASA and Clinger-Cohen Act. 
H2: The mean final cost overrun percentage on contracts in the development phase 
of the acquisition life cycle before the implementation of the FASA and Clinger-
Cohen Act is not equal to the mean final cost overrun percentage on contracts in 
the development phase after the implementation of the FASA and Clinger-Cohen 
Act. 
H3: The mean final cost overrun percentage on contracts in the production phase 
of the acquisition life cycle before the implementation of the FASA and Clinger-
Cohen Act is not equal to the mean final cost overrun percentage on contracts in 
the production phase after the implementation of the FASA and Clinger-Cohen 
Act. 
H4: The mean final cost overrun percentages on Army, Navy, and Air Force 
contracts completed before the implementation of the FASA and Clinger-Cohen 
Act are not equal to the mean final cost overrun percentages on Army, Navy, and 
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Air Force contracts completed after the implementation of the FASA and Clinger-
Cohen Act. 
H5: The mean final overrun percentage on fixed price contracts completed before 
the implementation of the FASA and Clinger-Cohen Act is not equal to the mean 
final overrun percentage on fixed price contracts completed after the 
implementation of the FASA and Clinger-Cohen Act. 
H6: The mean final overrun percentage on cost reimbursable contracts completed 
before the implementation of the FASA and Clinger-Cohen Act is not equal to the 
mean final overrun percentage on cost reimbursable contracts completed after the 
implementation of the FASA and Clinger-Cohen Act. 
Hypotheses two and three were motivated by Captain David Searle’s thesis, “The 
Impact of the Packard Commission’s Recommendations on Reducing Cost Overruns in 
Major Defense Programs.”  In Captain Searle’s thesis, he shows the impact of the 
Packard Commission’s recommendations on cost overruns differed between the stages of 
the acquisition lifecycle.  Specifically, he found that cost overruns on production 
contracts experienced no change, while cost overruns on development contracts worsened 
after the implementation of the Packard Commission’s recommendations (Searle, 1997: 
62-65). 
Similarly, hypothesis four was motivated by the follow up article to Captain 
Searle’s thesis.  The sensitivity analysis performed on the branches of service showed 
that Air Force contracts worsened after the implementation of the Packard Commission’s 
recommendations, while Army and Navy contracts experienced no change (Christensen, 
1999: 257)  
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Organization of the Research 
This study essentially picks up where other research has left off and provides an 
update to the same concerns addressed by past research.  The next chapter will examine 
more closely the FASA and the Clinger-Cohen Act.  It will also provide a more detailed 
look at the techniques used to calculate cost overruns.  The methodology used in the 
research is detailed in the third chapter.  It captures the data collection process and the 
methods used to prove or disprove the hypotheses.  In chapter four, the results of the 
hypothesis tests are summarized and discussed along with the statistical tests necessary to 
show the tests are valid.  The final chapter presents the conclusions of the study along 
with recommendations for future research. 
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II.  Literature Review 
 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides the reader with an overview of the acquisition reform 
initiatives relevant to this research and a discussion of the tools used to monitor cost 
performance in the Department of Defense (DoD).  It first details the Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act (FASA) and the Clinger-Cohen Act, emphasizing issues that are most 
pertinent to cost overruns.  Next, the Earned Value Management System (EVMS) is 
discussed along with how the EVMS can be used to show whether or not a program has 
experienced cost overruns.  Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of past 
research that has been accomplished with regard to acquisition reform and cost overruns. 
The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
 On October 13, 1994, President Clinton signed the FASA into law.  The FASA 
was a result of Vice President Gore’s National Performance Review (NPR).  Prior to the 
FASA, many people believed the acquisition process was overly cumbersome and 
complex (DSMC web site).  To alleviate those problems, the FASA introduced broader 
and more encompassing changes to the acquisition process than had any other acquisition 
reform legislation in the 10 years preceding (Tolan, 1998).  The Simplified Acquisition 
Threshold, the Federal Acquisition Computer Network, the Truth in Negotiation Act, and 
military standards and specifications are the major components of the FASA that may 
have an effect cost performance. 
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The Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT) establishes a ceiling value below 
which procurement officers are not required to publicly compete commercial buying 
activities.  The FASA raised this value from $25,000 to $100,000.  In order for 
competition not to be circumvented, the FASA stipulates that procurements not be broken 
down merely to avoid requirements that apply to purchases exceeding the SAT (FAR Part 
13).  It also eliminated much of the paperwork that goes along with these types of 
purchases, making the process much more efficient (Chinworth, 2000: 166). 
In accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), purchases between 
$2,500 and $100,000 are reserved for small businesses (FAR Part 19).  Related to the 
small business concerns, the FASA also includes preferential treatment for small 
disadvantaged businesses.  Specifically, there is a 5% goal for procurements to originate 
from women-owned businesses (Tolan, 1998: 17).  Purchases below $2,500 are 
considered “micropurchases” and are exempt from the small business requirement and 
the Buy American Act (DSMC web site). 
The Federal Acquisition Computer Network (FACNET) was introduced with the 
intentions, per the FASA objectives, of reducing the amount of paperwork required 
within the acquisition process (DSMC web site).  The FASA introduced the FACNET to 
the entire federal government (DSMC web site). 
Raising the threshold at which requirements of the Truth in Negotiation Act 
(TINA) apply was the third area addressed by the FASA that may have an impact on cost.  
TINA requires contractors to submit cost and pricing data and to certify the data as 
accurate.  A violation of TINA could result in defective pricing, and the contractor could 
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be penalized (Northrop Grumman, 2002).  The FASA raised the threshold to $500,000 
for civilian agencies and DoD procurements (DSMC web site). 
Perhaps the most significant change brought about by the FASA was the 
elimination of many military standards and specifications (DSMC web site).  Chinworth 
points out that these requirements were originally designed to: 
• support the development and production of complex, state-of-the-art weapons 
systems able to operate in demanding environments envisioned by military 
users; 
• guarantee that long-term logistic requirements could be met for complex 
weapons systems; 
• provide consistency in the implementation of complex programs; 
• guarantee integrity in government contracting while assuring reasonable 
profitability for its defense contractors; 
• maintain public accountability and prevent contractor abuses (Chinworth, 
2000: 166). 
 
As a result of the FASA, many procured items are now exempt from the 
requirement that cost and pricing data be submitted (DSMC web site).  Removing the 
cost and pricing data submission requirement has reduced time delays, shortened the 
research and development process, and eliminated many design specifications and tests.  
This change has simplified the procurement process which leads to cost savings (DSMC 
web site). 
The elimination of military specifications can have profound cost impact.  
Various studies address the idea that DoD regulations add a premium to the cost of 
products and services provided by government contractors.  In 1994, one such study was 
performed by TASC, Inc. and Coopers and Lybrand.  It has since become known as the 
“Perry Study” (Chinworth, 2000: 167).  The study concluded that regulations add a 
significant cost premium to DoD programs.  The study also asserts that corrective actions 
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can be accomplished with the FASA, and no other statutory changes are necessary 
(TASC, 1994: 47). 
A major improvement in reducing the number of DoD-specific requirements is 
the implementation of Single Process Initiatives (SPIs).  These initiatives give contractors 
a way to find a common ground among many production programs allowing better 
utilization of commercial standards and practices (Chinworth, 2000: 167).  Specific SPI 
proposals originate within the industry, which allow the contractor to develop ideas for 
making the processes more efficient (Chinworth, 2000: 167).  SPI proposals are tracked 
by the Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) via the Single Process 
Initiative System (SPIS) database, which is composed of reports from contractors and 
program managers (Chinworth, 2000: 168).  The SPIS database categorizes SPI 
initiatives in many different areas, including business, engineering, environmental, 
logistics, manufacturing, quality, safety, software, and testing (Chinworth, 2000: 169).  
Some of the SPI initiatives do not save money directly.  However, those initiatives that 
have reported cost savings reveal that the government is saving money through this 
acquisition reform effort (Chinworth, 2000: 171).  Table 1 shows the top ten cost 
reducing processes and their associated savings. 
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Table 1. Top 10 cost reducing processes and savings (Chinworth, 2000: 170) 
Process type No. of processes
reporting cost data
Combined cost
avoidance
and negotiated savings
Quality systems 45 $51M
Testing 16 $42M
Engineering-Configuration Management 43 $38M
Business - General 29 $34M
Logistics - Parts/Material Management 16 $25M
Manufacturing - Soldering/Welding 35 $24M
Quality - Multiple Processes 38 $19M
Business - Earned Value Management System 13 $16M
Quality - Nonconforming Material/MRB 13 $15M
Quality - Inspection 14 $11M  
 
The Clinger-Cohen Act 
Passed in 1996, the Clinger-Cohen Act, named for Congressman William Clinger 
and Senator William Cohen, resulted from two other pieces of acquisition reform 
legislation, the Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) and the Information Technology 
Management Reform Act (ITMRA).  The FARA and the ITMRA were passed as separate 
initiatives, since the impact they had on each other made them difficult to pass together 
(FISC website).  These two acts further advanced the changes made by the FASA 
(DSMC website).  Each is addressed separately in the following discussion. 
The FARA made specific changes to the Simplified Acquisition Procedures 
(SAP).  The FARA requires that SAP be used for commercial item purchases between 
$100,000 and $5 million (Pendolino and Causey, 1996: 7).  The FARA also removed the 
link between SAP and the FACNET.  As mentioned earlier, the FASA had raised the 
simplified acquisition threshold from $25,000 to $100,000.   It also required, however, 
that agencies adhere to a $50,000 threshold until they had implemented FACNET.  The 
FARA repealed this requirement, but stipulated that the agency must have full FACNET 
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capability by the end of 1999 or its threshold would be reduced to $50,000 (Pendolino 
and Causey, 1996: 7). 
Also addressed in the FARA, commercial items are exempt from the TINA.  That 
is, vendors are not required to submit cost or pricing data for contracts below the SAT of 
$500,000 (Pendolino and Causey, 1996: 8).  The FARA also released commercial items 
from the requirements of the Cost Accounting Standards (CAS).  Commercial items now 
have their own guidance consistent with commercial practices, FAR cost principles, and 
CAS.  This guidance is intended to ensure contractors do not overcharge the government 
(Pendolino and Causey, 1996: 8). 
The second piece of legislation comprising the Clinger-Cohen Act is the 
Information Technology Management Reform Act (ITMRA), passed because of long 
delays and multi-million dollar cost overruns on information technology (IT) projects.  
Two prime examples were the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax systems modernization 
and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) advanced automation system 
(Beachboard, 1997).  The ITMRA states that the FAR council will ensure that,  
to the maximum extent practicable, the process for acquisition of 
information technology is a simplified, clear, and understandable process 
that specifically addresses the management of risk, incremental 
acquisitions, and the need to incorporate commercial information 
technology in a timely manner (ITMRA Sec. 5201). 
 
One of the biggest changes brought about by the ITMRA is the repeal of Section 
111 of the Federal Property and Administrative services Act of 1949 known as the 
Brooks Act.  The Brooks Act gave the General Services Administration exclusive 
authority to procure information technology resources for all of the federal government 
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(Pendolino and Causey, 1996: 12).  The ITMRA effectively gives control of IT resources 
back to the individual agencies. 
Oversight for the acquisition of IT resources rests with the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB).  The director is required to encourage agencies to 
procure IT resources in a cost-effective manner (Pendolino and Causey, 1996:12).  Along 
with the responsibility of procuring IT resources for their agency, each executive director 
must issue guidance concerning cost/benefits, risks, and other evaluation criteria for IT 
acquisitions (Pendolino and Causey, 1996: 13). 
The ITMRA introduced a concept known as modular contracting for IT resources.  
Under this concept, agencies acquire an IT system in successive increments, which 
allows them to manage large acquisitions more efficiently.  The ITMRA requires the 
FAR to contain guidance on the use of modular contracting (Pendolino and Causey, 
1996: 13).  The ITMRA also encourages agencies to use pilot programs that test new and 
innovative ways of acquiring IT resources.  Upon discovering a way that saves money, 
the agency and contractor are allowed to share the savings (Pendolino and Causey, 1996: 
13). 
The Earned Value Management System 
This section discusses the building blocks of the earned value management 
system (EVMS) and how it is used to calculate cost overruns.  The EVMS has its roots in 
industry, but is primarily used by the DoD to analyze defense contracts and determine if 
they are on track with respect to their proposed budget and schedule (Christensen, 1998: 
374).  The government first mandated the use of earned value in 1967 as part of the 
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Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria (C/SCSC) (Fleming and Koppelman, 2000: 59).  
In 1996, the DoD changed the name from C/SCSC to the Earned Value Management 
Control Systems Criteria (DoD, 1996). 
For the EVMS to be effective, projects must have certain elements.  A budget and 
a schedule are two of the most important elements.  These elements provide a clear, 
demonstrable method for managing a defense contract of any size (Christensen, 1998: 
375).  Projects are typically subdivided into smaller, more manageable elements or work 
packages.  These work packages were originally called Cost Account Plans, but were 
more aptly renamed in 1996 as Control Account Plans (CAP), since more than costs 
alone are controlled at this level (Fleming and Koppelman, 2000: 59).  Each CAP 
comprises a detailed work plan, a time to start and finish each task, and an authorization 
for resources (i.e. budget).  The sum of all the CAPs makes up a project’s scope, 
schedule, and budget (Fleming and Koppelman, 2000: 111). 
There are three fundamental building blocks of the EVMS from which most 
earned value calculations can be accomplished.  These three building blocks include the 
Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled (BCWS), the Budgeted Cost of Work Performed 
(BCWP), and the Actual Cost of Work Performed (ACWP) (DSMC website).  The 
glossary of earned value terms from the website of the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics gives the following definitions for 
each of these terms: 
1. BCWS – the sum of budgets for all work packages and the amount of 
effort scheduled to be completed by a certain time.  It is used primarily for 
calculations related to schedule and will not be used for the purpose of this 
research.   
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2. BCWP – the sum of budgets for completed work packages and completed 
portions of work packages.  This is the “earned value” part. 
 
3. ACWP – the costs that were actually incurred and recorded in 
accomplishing the work in a given time period. 
 
The Budget at Completion (BAC) and the Estimate at Completion (EAC) are two 
other EVMS tools necessary in calculating cost overruns.  The BAC is the sum of all 
budgets established for the contract (DAU, 2001).  As Figure 2 shows below, it is the 
BCWS line extended to the end of the time period for any given contract.  The EAC is 
more difficult to calculate, since there are a multitude of EAC formulas.  For this reason, 
contractors usually submit a range of EACs (Christensen, 1993: 17).  One of the most 
popular EAC computations uses the cumulative Cost Performance Index (CPI) as the 
basis for determining the EAC (Christensen, 1996: 37).  The cumulative CPI (CPIcum) is 
the BCWP to date divided by the ACWP to date.  A CPIcum less than one is undesirable 
and indicates the contract is overrunning costs (Christensen, 2001).  Figure 2 shows the 
EAC as the ACWP line extrapolated out to the end of the time period for any given 
contract.   
The cumulative Cost Variance (CV) is calculated by subtracting the ACWP from 
the BCWP (DSMC website).  A negative number is the cost overrun to date; a positive 
number indicates the contract is under running costs.  The Variance at Completion (VAC) 
is calculated by subtracting the EAC from the BAC (DSMC website).  Similar to the CV, 
a negative VAC indicates a final cost overrun while a positive number indicates no cost 
overrun.  See Figure 2 for a graphical representation of these calculations. 
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Figure 2. EVMS Graph 
Past Research Regarding Acquisition Reform and Cost Overruns 
This section discusses past research related to acquisition reform and cost 
overruns.  The discussion is organized to illustrate how this research complements these 
past efforts.  It explains the focus, methodology, and conclusions of the following studies: 
“The Impact of the Packard Commission’s Recommendations on Reducing Cost 
Overruns on Defense Acquisition Contracts” (Christensen, Searle, and Vickery,1999), 
“Cost Overrun Optimism: Fact or Fiction?” (Christensen,1994), “Is the CPI-Based EAC a 
Lower Bound to the Final Cost of Post A-12 Contracts?” (Christensen and Rees,2001), 
and “Does a Rubber Baseline Guarantee Cost Overruns on Defense Acquisition 
Contracts” (Christensen and Gordon,1998). 
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The Packard Commission was formed by President Ronald Reagan in 1986 to 
review the defense acquisition process and recommend improvements to the procurement 
process that would minimize cost growth and reduce schedule delays (Christensen et al., 
1999: 251).  In their study of the Packard Commission, Christensen, Searle, and Vickery 
analyzed the effect of the recommendations by the Packard Commission on cost overruns 
among defense contracts (Christensen et al., 1999: 251). 
Prior to data analysis, Christensen, Searle, and Vickery hypothesized that cost 
performance among defense contracts would improve (i.e., cost overruns would decrease) 
after implementation of the Packard Commission’s recommendations (Christensen et al., 
1999: 254).  They tested this hypothesis by comparing the average cost overrun 
percentage on contracts completed before implementation to the average cost overrun 
percentage on contracts completed after implementation using a non-parametric test 
(Christensen et al., 1999: 254).  They used a non-parametric test because a parametric test 
failed the assumptions of normality and constant variance (Christensen, 1999: 262).  
They also tested whether cost performance was sensitive to contract phase or branch of 
service (Christensen et al., 1999: 256).  Using 269 contracts from the DAES database, 
their study yielded the results shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2. The Effect of Packard Commission Recommendations on Defense Cost 
Performance (Christensen et al., 1999: 257)  
 
All 
Contracts
Development 
Contracts
Production 
Contracts
Air 
Force Navy Army
Number of Contracts 269 8 188 113 134 22
Final overrun before 
implementation (%) 5.6 4.1 6.2 2.8 7.6 8.1
Final overrun after 
implementation (%) 9.5 15.3 7.2 12.7 6.1 17
Difference (%) 3.9 11.2 1.0 9.9 -1.5 8.9
Statistical Significance (p) 0.055 0.014 0.294 0.003 0.206 0.110
Contract Phase Managing Service
 
At an alpha of 0.10, they found that cost performance worsened overall after 
implementation of the Packard Commission’s recommendations (Christensen et al., 1999: 
256).  As Table 2 shows, they also discovered that the change in cost performance was 
sensitive to contract phase and branch of service.  The effect of implementing the 
Packard Commission’s recommendations varied between phases and branches of service.  
Perhaps the most startling finding from their study was that cost overruns on Air Force 
contracts more than tripled after implementation (Christensen et al., 1999: 257). 
The method used to calculate Estimates at Completion (EAC) is pertinent to this 
research.  Seeing how EACs are computed helps the reader see why there is a systematic 
problem with government contracts overrunning costs.  “Cost Overrun Optimism: Fact or 
Fiction?” (Christensen) is one study that shows how EACs are computed.  In this study, 
Christensen demonstrates the existence of a cultural problem by proving that cost 
overruns projected by the contractor and government are too optimistic over the life of 
the contract (Christensen, 1994: 25).   
Christensen’s 1994 study was partially motivated by the A-12 Administrative 
Inquiry completed by Chester Beach, which found “abiding cultural problems” not 
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unique to the Navy (Christensen 1996: 36).  In this inquiry, Beach speculates that 
pessimistic EACs (i.e., estimates that make the program look bad) are held back to 
protect the program and program managers’ careers (Christensen, 1994: 25).  Using 64 
completed contracts, Christensen tested this assertion by comparing overruns at various 
completion points with projected final costs to determine if government and contractor 
estimates are consistently optimistic (Christensen, 1994: 25).  For the purpose of his 
study, Christensen defined an overly optimistic estimate as one in which the projected 
final overrun is less than the current overrun.  As justification for this definition, 
Christensen cites multiple studies supporting the conclusion that a contract’s cost 
performance will not improve after the 15% completion point (Christensen, 1994: 29).  
He found that the government’s estimated overrun and the contractor’s estimated overrun 
were consistently optimistic throughout the life of contract. 
Another study, “Is the CPI-Based EAC a Lower Bound to the Final Cost of Post 
A-12 Contracts?” (Christensen and Rees, 2001) further enhances the understanding of 
how an EAC is calculated.  In this study, Christensen and Rees prove the validity of using 
the government’s rule for using the EAC based on the cumulative CPI (EACcpi) as a floor 
to the final cost of a contract (Christensen and Rees, 2001).  In other words, using the 
EACcpi assumes the cost performance of a contract will not improve and will either stay 
the same or worsen throughout the life of the contract.  To test the rule, Christensen and 
Rees formed the following null hypothesis:   
Ho:  CPI-based EAC ≥ Final Cost 
If the null hypothesis is not rejected, the EACcpi is not a floor to the final cost.  Rejection 
of the null validates the rule of using the EACcpi.  For the purpose of this study, the 
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cumulative CPI was calculated at three different completion points: the 20% point, the 
50% point, and the 70% point (Christensen and Rees, 2001). 
Since the Defense Acquisition Executive Summary database has contracts of all 
sizes, Christensen and Rees adjusted for these differences by normalizing the data as the 
deviation from final cost (DAC) using the following formula:  
FinalCost
FinalCostEACDAC −=  
(Christensen and Rees, 2001).  Using 52 post A-12 contracts (i.e., contracts starting after 
31 December 1991), they subdivided the database into contracts in development versus 
contracts in production, cost reimbursable contracts versus fixed price contracts, and 
Army contracts versus Navy contracts versus Air Force contracts.  The results are shown 
Table 3. 
Table 3. EAC Deviation From Final Cost (Christensen and Rees, 2001) 
mean p mean p mean p
All 52 -0.107 0.001 -0.047 0.014 0.003 0.559
Development 24 -0.146 0.003 -0.069 0.029 0.001 0.509
Production 26 -0.073 0.041 -0.018 0.23 0.018 0.834
Cost Reimbursable 34 -0.144 0.001 -0.063 0.018 0.002 0.527
Fixed Price 15 -0.025 0.255 -0.019 0.26 0.008 0.718
Army 14 -0.112 0.04 -0.076 0.077 0.014 0.615
Air Force 12 -0.185 0.011 -0.052 0.121 0.003 0.532
Navy 26 -0.069 0.057 -0.028 0.135 -0.004 0.575
Contract
Category
Early Stage Middle Stage Late Stage
n
 
As Table 3 shows, at an alpha of 0.05, the EACcpi is a reasonable floor to the final cost of 
contracts in the early and middle stages for all but Fixed Price and Navy contracts. 
When a contract undergoes frequent changes, many people assume the contract is 
more vulnerable to a cost overrun.  Christensen and Gordon’s study, “Does a Rubber 
Baseline Guarantee Cost Overruns on Defense Acquisition Contracts,” addresses this 
notion.  When changes are large and occur frequently, the contract has what is known as 
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a “rubber baseline” and is thought by some people to be the root of cost overruns 
(Christensen and Gordon, 1998: 43). 
Christensen and Gordon tested the relationship between cost overruns and 
baseline stability using two statistical models.  The first-test was a two factor analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) test using the schedule cost index (SCI) as the measure of cost 
overruns. The primary factor was the number of changes to the contract using the 
contract budget base (CBB) as the measure of baseline stability.  The CBB includes the 
Budget at Completion (BAC) and the Management Reserve (MR).  A significant change 
is defined as one that changes the CBB by more than 10%.  The secondary factor used in 
the ANOVA test was the contract’s completion point.  To test the relationship between 
the two factors and the SCI, they used an alpha level of 0.05 (Christensen and Gordon, 
1998: 45). 
The second analysis accomplished was a linear regression test using the last 
reported CPI (CPIL) as the measure of cost overruns and the coefficient of variation of the 
Performance Measurement Baseline (CVPMB) as the measure for baseline stability.  
Statistical significance was determined using the regression coefficient of the CVPMB.  If 
the coefficient of the CVPMB was significantly different from zero, they concluded that 
there is a relationship between the CPI and the PMB (Christensen and Gordon, 1998: 46). 
Christensen and Gordon’s study using the DAES database included 669 contracts 
from 165 programs for the ANOVA test and 401 contracts encompassing 131 programs 
for the linear regression test.  Based on the results from both tests, they found that there 
was no statistical relationship between baseline stability and cost overruns.  Also, this 
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finding was not sensitive to the branch of service in question (Christensen and Gordon, 
1998: 47).  A summary of their findings from each test is shown in Tables 4 and 5 below. 
Table 4. Summary of ANOVA Test 
 
Sources of Variation Sums of Squares Degrees of 
Freedom
Mean Square F F Critical 
(α=0.05)
Factor A: Quarters 0.1099 3 0.0366 1.251 2.618
Factor B: Changes 0.0890 4 0.0223 0.760 2.385
Interaction 0.5914 12 0.0493 1.683 1.767
Error 19.561 668 0.0293
 
Table 5. Summary of Regression Analysis 
 
Category n Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev β1 Std Error t
AF 151 0.96 0.11 0.36 0.58 0.004 0.015 0.271
Navy 142 0.94 0.11 0.32 0.42 -0.009 0.219 -0.407
Army 108 0.92 0.12 0.62 0.72 -0.006 0.016 -0.364
Sample CPIL CVPMB Slope
 
The results of Christensen and Gordon’s study showed that cost overruns were not 
caused by the stability of the baseline.  They conclude their study by stating that more 
research was needed in determining what caused a contract to have a cost overrun.  While 
this thesis does not directly address the cause of cost overruns, it does provide further 
insight into the issues addressed by the FASA and the Clinger-Cohen Act as they relate to 
cost overruns.  This insight can be used to stimulate further research into the issues 
addressed by the two pieces of legislation. 
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III.  Methodology 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides an overview of the process and tools used to conduct the 
research and data analysis for this effort.  It begins with a discussion of the Defense 
Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) database, followed by how its data is 
aggregated into the sample that is used for testing the hypotheses.  It then re-introduces 
the hypotheses stated in Chapter 1 coupled with a more thorough discussion of each 
hypothesis and how each pertains to the research.  The hypotheses section is followed by 
a presentation of the tests that will be used to prove or disprove the hypotheses.  This 
section will define the hypothesis tests and their corresponding assumptions and also 
describe the tests associated with each assumption.  The chapter concludes by detailing 
the significance levels and possible errors that could occur.  
DAES Database 
The DAES database is a part of the Consolidated Acquisition Reporting System 
(CARS), which is a “personal computer-based data entry and reporting system” (CARS 
website).  CARS is comprised of the DAES, the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), and 
the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB).  Its main purpose is to achieve the following 
objectives: 
1. Reduce the workload in preparing the APB, DAES, and SAR 
 
2. Standardize and automate project status information for program managers 
and other acquisition executives 
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3. Provide timely and accurate tools to the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) (OUSD(AT&L)) and 
the military services for the purpose of analysis 
 
4. Improve acquisition data management and interchange capabilities 
 
5. Establish software, data, and documentation standards for acquisition 
(CARS website). 
 
The use of CARS is mandatory for all Major Defense Acquisition Programs (ACAT I) 
and Major Automated Information Systems (ACAT IA).  An ACAT I program is defined 
as a program estimated by the Under Secretary of Defense-Acquisition Technology and 
Logistics (USD-AT&L) to require eventual expenditure for research, development, test, 
and evaluation of more than $365 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2000 constant dollars.  A 
program is considered an ACAT IA if it is 1) designated by the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD-C3I), or 2) 
estimated to require more than $32 million in program costs for any given year, more 
than $126 million in total program costs, or more than $378 million in total lifecycle 
costs.  All costs are FY 2000 constant dollars (DAU Glossary, 2001).  The CARS 
software specifies the format of the DAES with the exception of the memo and comment 
fields (DOD 5000.2-R, 2002). 
The DAES serves as an early warning report to the OUSD-AT&L by describing 
any actual and potential program problems.  It also describes any mitigating actions taken 
(DOD 5000.2-R, 2002).  The DAES presents total projected costs and quantities for all 
years through the end of the current phase of the acquisition life cycle (DOD 5000.2-R, 
2002).  All ACAT I and ACAT IA programs are required to report program status 
information to the DAES database on a quarterly basis (DOD 5000.2-R, 2002).  There are 
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two times when this quarterly cycle is not adhered to. It is not adhered to when a Nunn-
McCurdy breach has occurred or is suspected to occur.  A Nunn-McCurdy breach is 
when “the program acquisition unit cost (PAUC) or the average procurement unit cost 
(APUC) (in base-year dollars) increases by 15% or more over the PAUC objective or 
APUC objective of the currently approved APB (in base year dollars)” (DOD 5000.2-R, 
2002).  The DAES quarterly reporting cycle is also not adhered to when a Program 
Objective Memorandum (POM) or Budget Estimate Submission (BES) causes a program 
to deviate from the approved APB threshold.  Both of these situations require an out of 
cycle submission to the DAES database (DOD 5000.2-R, 2002). 
The following columns from the DAES database are pertinent to this research: 
1. Contract Identification (CID) – The CID is a number assigned to each 
contract.  It is used in this research to ensure that no contracts are repeated 
and to identify the branch of service responsible for the contract. 
 
2. Contract Number (CNO) – The CNO is a number assigned to each 
contract for further identification.  It is also used in this research to 
determine that no contracts are repeated. 
 
3. Submit Date (SUBMITDATE) – This is the date the data was submitted to 
the DAES database.  It is used in this research to represent the contract 
completion date. 
 
4. Program Phase (PPHASE) – PPHASE is the phase of the acquisition 
lifecycle the contract was in at the time the data was submitted.  It is used 
in this research to divide the data into phases. 
 
5. Actual Cost of Work Performed (ACWP) – An element of the EVMS, it is 
the cumulative cost of the work completed to date.  It is used in this 
research to calculate cost overruns. 
 
6. Budgeted Cost of Work Performed (BCWP) – The BCWP is the 
cumulative budgeted cost of the work performed to date.  It is also used in 
this research to calculate cost overruns. 
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7. Cumulative Budget Base (CBBASE) – The CBBASE is the total budget for 
the contract.  It is used in conjunction with the Management Reserve to 
calculate the completion percentage of a contract. 
 
8. Management Reserve (MR) – The MR is money set aside that is used at 
the discretion of top management. 
 
9. Contract Type (CTYPE) – The CTYPE is the type of contract for the 
corresponding line item.  It is used to subdivide the database into Fixed 
Price contracts and Cost Reimbursable contracts. 
 
Since the DAES database contains contracts dated back to 1970, it had to be 
scaled back to include only those contracts relevant to the research questions.  First, all 
contracts completed before December 31, 1993 and after December 31, 2001 were 
removed.  This time period was selected based on Searle’s Packard Commission study 
(Searle, 1997: 39).  The time period was also based on expert opinion after discussions 
with Dr. David Christensen, an expert in the earned value field and Ms. Sandra Meckley, 
a representative of the acquisition office for the Secretary of the Air Force.  This 
timeframe is appropriate since it encompasses the enacting of the FASA and the Clinger-
Cohen Act.  Contracts within this timeframe are further separated into groups on either 
side of December 31, 1997. 
The second step in organizing the DAES database used the following equation to 
determine the percentage completion of each contract: 
MRCBBASE
BCWP
−
 
Contracts that were not more than 75% complete were removed from the database.  Most 
costs are incurred between the 15 and 75 percent completion points.  This is shown in 
Figure 2 by the cost curve flattening out as the contract nears completion.  Studies have 
shown costs to be relatively stable beyond the 75% completion point.  Thus, a contract 
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that is at least 75% complete is considered complete in terms of costs incurred (Searle, 
1997: 41). 
The third step used the CID and the CNO to determine if there were multiple 
instances of the same contract.  If any duplicate contracts were found, the latest 
submission was retained and the rest were discarded.  The following table shows the 
number of contracts in each sample that were used for hypotheses testing. 
Table 6. Treatment Matrix of DOD Contracts 
Category 
Pre-
1997 Post-1997 
H1 - Total Contracts 107 113 
H2 - Development 41 64 
H3 - Production 66 49 
H4 - Army 19 28 
H4 - Navy 47 58 
H4 - Air Force 41 27 
H5 - Fixed Price 39 54 
H6 - Cost 
Reimbursable 67 59 
 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This section reintroduces the research questions posed in Chapter 1.  Each 
research question will be followed by a corresponding hypothesis and a brief discussion 
of its relevance to the research.  Keep in mind that the overall goal of this research is to 
determine if the FASA and the Clinger-Cohen Act had any effect on cost overruns among 
DoD contracts. 
Research Question #1 
Compared to contracts completed before the FASA and Clinger-Cohen Act, did 
cost overruns on contracts completed after the FASA and Clinger-Cohen Act 
significantly worsen, stay the same, or improve? 
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Research Hypothesis #1 
HA: The mean final cost overrun percentage on contracts completed before 
December 31, 1997 is not equal to the mean final cost overrun percentage on 
contracts completed after December 31, 1997. 
 
The answer to this question will help determine whether the FASA and the 
Clinger-Cohen Act had an effect on cost overruns.  The final cost overrun percentage is 
used instead of the actual overrun to make the contracts comparable.  The DAES includes 
contracts of all sizes, and to compare a $1 million contract to a $100 million contract 
could be misleading.  To illustrate, a $1 million cost overrun on the former contract 
would yield an overrun percentage of 100%, whereas the same cost overrun on the latter 
contract would be a 1% overrun.  Thus, the overruns are normalized to prevent this 
problem.  Equation 1 presented below is used to calculate the final cost overrun.  
Equation 2 is used to convert the final overrun from a dollar amount to a percentage.  The 
Budget at Completion (BAC) is calculated by subtracting the Management Reserve (MR) 
from the Contract Budget Base (CBBASE). 
ACWPBACunFinalOverr −=         (1) 
BAC
ACWPBACunFinalOverr −=%      (2) 
Research question #2 is addressed by two hypotheses.  They are presented together with 
the discussion following. 
Research Question #2 
Is the effect of the FASA and Clinger-Cohen Act on cost overruns sensitive to the 
phase of the acquisition life cycle the contract is in? 
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Research Hypothesis #2 
HA: With respect to contracts in the development phase of the acquisition 
lifecycle, the final overrun percentage on contracts completed before December 
31, 1997 is not equal to the final overrun percentage on contracts completed after 
December 31, 1997. 
 
Research Hypothesis #3 
HA: With respect to contracts in the production phase of the acquisition lifecycle, 
the final overrun percentage on contracts completed before December 31, 1997 is 
not equal to the final overrun percentage on contracts completed after December 
31, 1997. 
 
 
After considering the overall effect the FASA and Clinger-Cohen Act have had on 
cost overruns, the sensitivity to phases of the acquisition lifecycle is addressed by the two 
research questions stated above.  Research hypothesis #2 looks at development contracts, 
while research hypothesis #3 deals with only those contracts in the production phase of 
the acquisition lifecycle.  Even if this research determines the FASA and Clinger-Cohen 
Act have had no effect on cost overruns, the answer to these questions will provide senior 
leadership with additional insight as to where efforts should be focused on reducing cost 
overruns.  It will also help determine if tactics need to be adjusted for contracts in 
different phases of the acquisition lifecycle. 
Research Question #3 
Is the effect of the FASA and the Clinger-Cohen Act on cost overruns sensitive to 
the branch of service responsible for the contract? 
 
Research Hypothesis #4 
HA: The mean final cost overrun percentages for Army, Navy and Air Force 
contracts completed before December 31, 1997 are not equal to the mean final 
cost overrun percentages on Army, Navy and Air Force contracts completed after 
December 31, 1997. 
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This research question was motivated by Christensen, Searle and Vickery’s 
research.  Since they found that cost overruns were drastically worse for the Air Force 
after implementation of the Packard Commission’s findings, it was a natural curiosity to 
see how the respective branches of service have been performing since then.  This 
comparison will be accomplished by using the Contract ID number (CID) to identify 
which branch of service is responsible and dividing the contracts into respective samples.  
This research question does not address Marine contracts individually.  An initial 
inspection of the database revealed that there were an insufficient number of Marine 
contracts to comprise their own sample.  Since the Marines are part of the Department of 
the Navy (DoN), these contracts were rolled into the Navy sample and treated as Navy 
contracts.  For testing purposes, this hypothesis will be divided into three sub-hypotheses 
to test each service individually. 
Research Question #4 
Is the effect of the FASA and Clinger-Cohen Act on cost overruns sensitive to the 
type of contract?  
 
Research Hypothesis #5 
The mean final overrun percentage on fixed price contracts completed before the 
implementation of the FASA and Clinger-Cohen Act is not equal to the mean 
final overrun percentage on fixed price contracts completed after the 
implementation of the FASA and Clinger-Cohen Act. 
 
Research Hypothesis #6 
The mean final overrun percentage on cost reimbursable contracts completed 
before the implementation of the FASA and Clinger-Cohen Act is not equal to the 
mean final overrun percentage on cost reimbursable contracts completed after the 
implementation of the FASA and Clinger-Cohen Act. 
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Hypothesis #5 and Hypothesis #6 will determine if there is a difference in the 
effect the FASA and Clinger-Cohen Act had on cost overruns.  This research question 
was motivated by the fundamental difference in contract types.  In a fixed price contract, 
the contractor bears the financial burden of a cost overrun.  Since the price is fixed, a cost 
overrun must be absorbed by the contractor’s profit.  Conversely, in a cost reimbursable 
contract, the contractor is generally reimbursed the total cost of the contract plus a fixed 
fee.  Therefore, a cost overrun on a cost reimbursable contract is absorbed by the 
government.  This basic difference of how cost overruns are handled between the two 
types of contracts creates a natural curiosity that this research can satisfy. 
Hypothesis Tests 
This section discusses the hypothesis tests used to compare the samples.  It details 
how the tests will be conducted, presents the necessary formulas, and also provides a 
discussion of any key assumptions that are pertinent to draw inferences from the results 
of the tests.  A flowchart, which graphically depicts the logical steps taken to test the 
hypotheses, is presented at the end of this section. 
The two sample t-test is used to test the hypotheses stated above.  It uses the 
sample means of the final overrun percentage and tests that the difference between the 
sample means is zero.  If the test does show that the difference between the sample means 
is zero, then the difference between the population means can be inferred to be zero as 
well.  The t-test uses a standardized variable (t) that follows a t distribution with ν 
degrees of freedom.  The t-test statistic and degrees of freedom are calculated using 
equations 3 and 4: 
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x = sample mean from the first sample, 
y =sample mean from the second sample,  
s1= sample variance from the first sample, 
s2= sample variance from the second sample, 
m = sample size of the first sample, 
n = sample size of the second sample. 
(Devore, 2000: 366) 
 
Since the research questions are focused on determining if the final overrun 
percentages are equal and are concerned with which sample is greater, a two tailed test is 
appropriate.  The null hypotheses will be rejected under the following conditions: 
t ≥ tα/2,ν  or  t ≤ -tα/2,ν 
The two sample t-test has two key assumptions that should be satisfied to validate its 
inferences.  The first assumption is that the observations are normally distributed.  The 
normality assumption is assessed visually and quantitatively.  The visual assessment is 
accomplished by constructing a normal probability plot and checking its linearity.  If the 
observations come from a normal distribution, the line should fall close to a straight line 
(Devore, 2000: 190).  The quantitative assessment for normality is accomplished using 
the Shapiro-Wilk test.  The calculations for the Shapiro-Wilk test are performed using the 
(4) 
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JMP software package, version 5.0.  The Shapiro-Wilk test yields a p-value between 0 
and 1.  Normality can be assumed when the p-value is greater than 0.05. 
Fortunately, since this research involves using averages of the final cost overruns, 
it is not absolutely necessary to have normally distributed data.  The central limit theorem 
states “if [the sample size] is sufficiently large, the [mean] has approximately a normal 
distribution” (Devore, 2000: 235).  This theorem allows the two sample t-test to be used 
in the absence of normality and still have confidence in the resulting inferences.  The 
theorem is somewhat ambiguous stating that the sample size must be “sufficiently large.” 
It is not specific because the number of required observations varies from sample to 
sample.  Having a sample size greater than 30 is generally accepted as a sufficiently large 
number for any distribution (Devore, 2000: 236).  For this research, three groups of 
contracts have sample sizes less than 30: the pre-1997 Army contracts, the post-1997 
Army contracts, and the post-1997 Air Force contracts.  As shown in Table 6, their 
respective sample sizes are 19, 28, and 27.  For tests involving these samples, it will be 
important for the results of the t-test to be corroborated by the results of a non-parametric 
test.  The non-parametric used for corroboration is the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, which 
does not require the assumption of normality.   
The second assumption for the two sample t-test is that the observations have 
constant variance.  Constant variance will be tested using the modified Levene test.  It is 
a robust test that can be used in the absence of normality and when sample sizes are not 
equal (Neter et al, 1996: 766).  These calculations are also accomplished using JMP, 
version 5.0.   The details of these calculations can be found in the 4th edition of Applied 
Linear Statistical Models by Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, and Wasserman.  The Levene 
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test yields a p-value which needs to be greater than 0.05 to assume constant variance.  
Conversely, if a p-value of less than 0.05 is obtained, it cannot be assumed that the data 
has constant variance.  For the samples without constant variance, it is important that the 
two sample t-test be corroborated by a test that does not require homogenous variances.  
The test used to support the conclusions drawn with the two sample t-test is the Welch 
ANOVA test.  The Welch ANOVA test is commonly used in the absence of non-
homogenous variances to test whether the means of the two samples are equal.  In this 
test, the means are weighted by the reciprocal of the sample variances of the group means 
(JMP, 2002).  The flowchart in Figure 3 shows the logic involved in the selection of the 
appropriate hypothesis tests. 
Use Shapiro 
Wilk to test for 
normality
Is it 
normal?
no Is sample 
size greater 
than 30?
no
yes yes
Use Modified 
Levene to test 
for constant 
variance 
Corroborate t-
test with 
Wilcoxon
Signed Rank
Constant 
Variance?
no Corroborate t-test with Welch 
ANOVA
yes
Run t-test
 
Figure 3. Flowchart for Hypothesis Test Selection 
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Significance Level and Errors 
The level of significance for this research is set at an alpha level of 0.05.  In other 
words, this is the smallest p-value at which the null hypotheses are not rejected.  This 
level alpha is used for the hypothesis tests and for the assumptions of normality and 
constant variance tests.  For the hypothesis tests, using an alpha level of 0.05 allows us to 
be confident that the corresponding means fall somewhere between the upper 2.5% and 
lower 2.5% tails of the t distribution.  A higher p-value means we are even more 
confident that the mean is located in the desired area.  So the user is able to use judgment 
in the interpretation of this research, the associated p-values are reported. 
When drawing conclusions from the results of any research using hypothesis 
testing procedures, it is inevitable that errors may occur.  It is possible for the null 
hypothesis to be rejected when it should not be rejected.  In this situation, a type I error is 
said to have occurred.  It is also possible to fail to reject the null hypothesis when it 
should have been rejected.  This error is known as a Type II error.  The only way to have 
a hypothesis test where no errors can occur is to be able to examine the entire population 
(Devore, 2000: 314).  Since many of the contracts in the DAES database were excluded 
from the study for various reasons (e.g. incomplete data) and many smaller contracts are 
not included in the database, the entire population of DoD contracts is not available.  This 
research uses a representative sample; however, inferences based on the results of this 
study should be interpreted with the knowledge that these two errors may be present. 
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IV.  Results 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents the results of the hypothesis tests along with the results of 
the tests for the assumptions of normality and constant variance.  Each hypothesis is 
presented individually with the results of the normality and constant variance tests shown 
first followed by the associated hypothesis tests.  The redundancy in this chapter is 
intended to allow the results of each hypothesis to stand alone. This method of 
organization gives the reader some flexibility in how the chapter is read.  The results and 
associated statistics for each hypothesis are summarized at the end of the chapter. 
Hypothesis #1 
Normality for the samples corresponding to Hypothesis #1 is tested both visually 
and quantitatively.  The visual test is accomplished by using a normal probability plot.  A 
perfectly normal distribution is depicted in a normal probability plot by a straight line.  
Therefore, an approximate straight line can be assumed to approach a normal distribution.  
Figures 4 and 5 in Appendix A show the normal probability plots associated with 
Hypothesis #1.  Figure 4 is constructed using the Pre-1997 contracts, and Figure 5 is 
constructed using the Post-1997 contracts.  As one can see, the plots do not yield straight 
lines, so it is likely that these two samples are not normally distributed.  The quantitative 
test for normality, the Shapiro-Wilk test, yields test statistic of 0.806 and 0.944 
respectively and p-values of less than 0.0002.  Since this is less than the alpha of 0.05, 
this confirms that these two samples do not come from populations with a normal 
distribution.  See Table 7 for a summary of the tests for normality. 
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The modified Levene test, which is the test for equal variances, yields a test 
statistic of 26.9445 and a p-value of less than 0.0001.  Since the p-value is less than the 
0.05 level of significance, it can be assumed that these samples do not have constant 
variance.  See Table 7 for a summary of the tests for constant variance. 
Even though the assumption of normality is violated, the Central Limit Theorem 
stated in Chapter 3 allows for the two sample t-test to be used in the absence of 
normality.  Since the samples do not have constant variance, the Welch ANOVA test is 
also performed to validate the results of the t-test.  Using the t-test to test that the mean of 
the first sample is equal to the mean of the second sample yields a test statistic of 4.345 
and a p-value of less than 0.0001.  The Welch ANOVA test supports these results with a 
test statistic of 18.2374 and a p-value of less than 0.0001.  Therefore, the null hypothesis 
is rejected and one can assume that the mean final overrun percentage of the pre-1997 
contracts is not equal to the mean final overrun percentage of the post-1997 contracts.  
Since the mean final overrun percentage of the post-1997 contracts is better than the 
mean final overrun percentage of the pre-1997 contracts, one can assume that cost 
overruns improved after the treatment date of December 31, 1997.  See Table 7 for a 
complete summary of the results for this hypothesis. 
Hypothesis #2 
Normality for the samples corresponding to Hypothesis #2 is tested both visually 
and quantitatively.  The visual test is accomplished by using a normal probability plot.  
Figures 6 and 7 in Appendix A show the normal probability plots associated with 
Hypothesis #2.  Figure 6 is constructed using the Pre-1997 development contracts, and 
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Figure 7 is constructed using the Post-1997 development contracts.  As one can see, the 
plots do not yield straight lines, so it is likely that these two samples are not normally 
distributed.  The quantitative test for normality, the Shapiro-Wilk test, yields test 
statistics of 0.823 and 0.925 respectively and p-values of less than 0.0007.  Since the p-
value is less than the alpha of 0.05, this confirms that these two samples to not come from 
populations with a normal distribution.  See Table 7 for a summary of the tests for 
normality. 
The modified Levene test, which is the test for equal variances, yields a test 
statistic of 17.1864 and a p-value of less than 0.0001.  Since the p-value is less than the 
0.05 level of significance, it can be assumed that these samples do not have constant 
variance.  See Table 7 for a summary of the tests for constant variance. 
Even though the assumption of normality is violated, the Central Limit Theorem 
stated in Chapter 3 allows for the two sample t-test to be used in the absence of 
normality. Since the samples do not have constant variance, the Welch ANOVA test is 
also performed to validate the results of the t-test.  Using the two sample t-test to test that 
the mean of the first sample is equal to the mean of the second sample yields a test 
statistic of 4.098 and a p-value of less than 0.0001.  The Welch ANOVA test supports 
these results with a test statistic of 12.3937 and a p-value of 0.0009.  Therefore, the null 
hypothesis is rejected and one can assume that the mean final overrun percentage of the 
pre-1997 development contracts is not equal to the mean final overrun percentage of the 
post-1997 development contracts.  Since the mean final overrun percentage of the post-
1997 development contracts is better than the mean final overrun percentage of the pre-
1997 development contracts, one can assume that cost overruns for contracts in the 
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development phase of the acquisition lifecycle improved after the treatment date of 
December 31, 1997.  See Table 7 for a complete summary of the results for this 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis #3 
Normality for the samples corresponding to Hypothesis #3 is tested both visually 
and quantitatively.  The visual test is accomplished by using a normal probability plot.  
Figures 8 and 9 in Appendix A show the normal probability plots associated with 
Hypothesis #3.  Figure 8 is constructed using the pre-1997 production contracts, and 
Figure 9 is constructed using the post-1997 production contracts.  As one can see, the 
plots do not yield straight lines, so it is likely that these two samples are not normally 
distributed.  The quantitative test for normality, the Shapiro-Wilk test, yields test 
statistics of 0.790 and 0.962 and p-values of less than 0.0001 and 0.1941, respectively.  
Since the p-value for the pre-1997 production contracts is less than the alpha of 0.05, this 
confirms that this sample does not come from a population with a normal distribution.  
However, based on the p-value associated with the post-1997 production contracts, this 
sample appears to be normally distributed.  See Table 7 for a summary of the tests for 
normality. 
The modified Levene test, which is the test for equal variances, yields a test 
statistic of 9.4562 and a p-value of 0.0026.  Since the p-value is less than the 0.05 level of 
significance, it can be assumed that these samples do not have constant variance.  See 
Table 7 for a summary of the tests for constant variance. 
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Even though the assumption of normality is violated with one of these samples, 
the Central Limit Theorem allows for the two sample t-test to be used to test this 
hypothesis.  The Central Limit Theorem stated in Chapter 3 allows for the two sample t-
test to be used in the absence of normality.  Since the samples do not have constant 
variance, the Welch ANOVA test is also performed to validate the results of the t-test.  
Using the two sample t-test to test that the mean of the first sample is equal to the mean 
of the second sample yields a test statistic of 2.588 and a p-value of 0.0109.  The Welch 
ANOVA test supports these results with a test statistic of 8.0131 and a p-value of 0.0056.  
Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected and one can assume that the mean final overrun 
percentage of the pre-1997 production contracts is not equal to the mean final overrun 
percentage of the post-1997 production contracts.  Since the mean final overrun 
percentage of the post-1997 production contracts is better than the mean final overrun 
percentage of the pre-1997 production contracts, one can assume that cost overruns for 
contracts in the production phase of the acquisition lifecycle improved after the treatment 
date of December 31, 1997.  See Table 7 for a complete summary of the results for this 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis #4 
The final hypothesis is divided in three sub-hypotheses dealing with Army, Navy, 
and Air Force contracts separately.  Each sub-hypothesis has its own tests for normality 
and constant variance along with an associated two sample t-test to assess each sub-
hypothesis. 
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Army Contracts 
Normality for the samples corresponding to sub-hypothesis #1 of Hypothesis #4 is 
tested both visually and quantitatively.  The visual test is accomplished by using a normal 
probability plot.  Figures 10 and 11 in Appendix A show the normal probability plots 
associated with sub-hypothesis #1 of Hypothesis #4.  Figure 10 is constructed using the 
pre-1997 Army contracts, and Figure 11 is constructed using the post-1997 Army 
contracts.  As one can see, the plots do not yield straight lines, so it is likely that these 
two samples are not normally distributed.  The quantitative test for normality, the 
Shapiro-Wilk test, yields test statistics of 0.707 and 0.908 and p-values of less than 
0.0001 and 0.0189, respectively.  Since the p-values for these two samples are less than 
the alpha of 0.05, this confirms that these samples do not come from a population with a 
normal distribution.  See Table 7 for a summary of the tests for normality. 
The modified Levene test, which is the test for equal variances, yields a test 
statistic of 3.6796 and a p-value of 0.0614.  Since the p-value is greater than the 0.05 
level of significance, it can be assumed that these samples do have constant variance.  
See Table 7 for a summary of the tests for constant variance. 
Since the assumption of normality is violated with these two samples and the 
sample sizes are too small to invoke the Central Limit Theorem, the two sample t-test 
must be corroborated by the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test.  Using the two sample t-test to 
test that the mean of the first sample is equal to the mean of the second sample yields a 
test statistic of 2.591 and a p-value of 0.0128.  The Wilcoxon Signed Rank test supports 
these results with a test statistic of -2.265 and a p-value of 0.0235.  Therefore, the null 
hypothesis is rejected and one can assume that the mean final overrun percentage of the 
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pre-1997 Army contracts is not equal to the mean final overrun percentage of the post-
1997 Army contracts.  Since the mean final overrun percentage of the post-1997 Army 
contracts is better than the mean final overrun percentage of the pre-1997 Army 
contracts, one can assume that cost overruns on Army contracts improved after the 
treatment date of December 31, 1997.  See Table 7 for a complete summary of the results 
for this hypothesis. 
Navy Contracts 
Normality for the samples corresponding to sub-hypothesis #2 of Hypothesis #4 is 
tested both visually and quantitatively.  The visual test is accomplished by using a normal 
probability plot.  Figures 12 and 13 in Appendix A show the normal probability plots 
associated with sub-hypothesis #2 of Hypothesis #4.  Figure 12 is constructed using the 
pre-1997 Navy contracts, and Figure 13 is constructed using the post-1997 Navy 
contracts.  As one can see, the plots do not yield straight lines, so it is likely that these 
two samples are not normally distributed.  The quantitative test for normality, the 
Shapiro-Wilk test, yields test statistics of 0.857 and 0.951 and p-values of less than 
0.0001 and 0.0384, respectively.  Since the p-values for these two samples are less than 
the alpha of 0.05, this confirms that these samples do not come from a population with a 
normal distribution.  See Table 7 for a summary of the tests for normality. 
The modified Levene test, which is the test for equal variances, yields a test 
statistic of 21.997 and a p-value of less than 0.0001.  Since the p-value is less than the 
0.05 level of significance, it can be assumed that these samples do not have constant 
variance.  See Table 7 for a summary of the tests for constant variance. 
 
 44
Even though the assumption of normality is violated with these two samples, the 
Central Limit Theorem stated in Chapter Three allows for the two sample t-test to be 
used to test this hypothesis.  Since the samples do not have constant variance, the Welch 
ANOVA test is also performed to validate the results of the t-test.  Using the two sample 
t-test to test that the mean of the first sample is equal to the mean of the second sample 
yields a test statistic of 3.578 and a p-value of 0.0005.  The Welch ANOVA test supports 
these results with a test statistic of 11.0182 and a p-value of 0.0016.  Therefore, the null 
hypothesis is rejected and one can assume that the mean final overrun percentage of the 
pre-1997 Navy contracts is not equal to the mean final overrun percentage of the post-
1997 Navy contracts.  Since the mean final overrun percentage of the post-1997 Navy 
contracts is better than the mean final overrun percentage of the pre-1997 Navy contracts, 
one can assume that cost overruns on Navy contracts improved after the treatment date of 
December 31, 1997.  See Table 7 for a complete summary of the results for this 
hypothesis. 
Air Force Contracts 
Normality for the samples corresponding to sub-hypothesis #3 of Hypothesis #4 is 
tested both visually and quantitatively.  The visual test is accomplished by using a normal 
probability plot.  Figures 14 and 15 in Appendix A show the normal probability plots 
associated with sub-hypothesis #3 of Hypothesis #4.  Figure 14 is constructed using the 
pre-1997 Air Force contracts, and Figure 15 is constructed using the post-1997 Air Force 
contracts.  As one can see, the plots do not yield straight lines, so it is likely that these 
two samples are not normally distributed.  The quantitative test for normality, the 
Shapiro-Wilk test, yields test statistics of 0.750 and 0.936 and p-values of less than 
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0.0001 and 0.1043, respectively.  Since the p-value for the pre-1997 Air Force contracts 
is less than the alpha of 0.05, this confirms that this sample does not come from a 
population with a normal distribution.  Based on the p-value associated with the post-
1997 Air Force contracts, this sample appears to be normally distributed.  Like the post-
1997 production contracts, this sample also shows why a visual check is not completely 
adequate when testing for normality.  See Table 7 for a summary of the tests for 
normality. 
The modified Levene test, which is the test for equal variances, yields a test 
statistic of 4.4692 and a p-value of less than 0.0383.  Since the p-value is less than the 
0.05 level of significance, it can be assumed that these samples do not have constant 
variance.  See Table 7 for a summary of the tests for constant variance. 
Even though the assumption of normality is violated with one of these samples, 
the Central Limit Theorem stated in Chapter Three allows for the two sample t-test to be 
used to test this hypothesis.  Since the samples do not have constant variance, the Welch 
ANOVA test is also performed to validate the results of the t-test.  Using the two sample 
t-test to test that the mean of the first sample is equal to the mean of the second sample 
yields a test statistic of 1.580 and a p-value of 0.1188.  The Welch ANOVA test supports 
these results with a test statistic of 3.2134 and a p-value of 0.0779.  Therefore, the null 
hypothesis is not rejected and one can assume that the mean final overrun percentage of 
the pre-1997 Air Force contracts is equal to the mean final overrun percentage of the 
post-1997 Air Force contracts.  Since the mean final overrun percentage of the post-1997 
Air Force contracts is statistically the same as the mean final overrun percentage of the 
pre-1997 Air Force contracts, one can assume that cost overruns on Air Force contracts 
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experienced no change after the treatment date of December 31, 1997.  See Table 7 for a 
complete summary of the results for this hypothesis. 
Hypothesis #5 
Normality for the samples corresponding to Hypothesis #5 is tested both visually 
and quantitatively.  The visual test is accomplished by using a normal probability plot.  
Figures 16 and 17 in Appendix A show the normal probability plots associated with 
Hypothesis #5.  Figure 16 is constructed using the pre-1997 fixed price contracts, and 
Figure 17 is constructed using the post-1997 fixed price contracts.  As one can see, the 
plots do not yield straight lines, so it is likely that these two samples are not normally 
distributed.  The quantitative test for normality, the Shapiro-Wilk test, yields test 
statistics of 0.913 and 0.934 and p-values of 0.0060 and 0.0074, respectively.  Since the 
p-values for these two samples are less than the alpha of 0.05, this confirms that these 
samples do not come from normally distributed populations.  See Table 7 for a summary 
of the tests for normality. 
The modified Levene test, which is the test for equal variances, yields a test 
statistic of 15.872 and a p-value of 0.0001.  Since the p-value is less than the 0.05 level of 
significance, it can be assumed that these samples do not have constant variance.  See 
Table 7 for a summary of the tests for constant variance. 
Even though the assumption of normality is violated with these two samples, the 
Central Limit Theorem allows for the two sample t-test to be used to test this hypothesis.  
Since the samples do not have constant variance, the Welch ANOVA test is also 
performed to validate the results of the t-test.  Using the two sample t-test to test that the 
 
 47
mean of the first sample is equal to the mean of the second sample yields a test statistic of 
2.364 and a p-value of 0.0202.  The Welch ANOVA test supports these results with a test 
statistic of 4.8804 and a p-value of 0.031.  Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected and 
one can assume that the mean final overrun percentage of the pre-1997 fixed price 
contracts is not equal to the mean final overrun percentage of the post-1997 fixed price 
contracts.  Since the mean final overrun percentage of the post-1997 fixed price contracts 
is better than the mean final overrun percentage of the pre-1997 fixed price contracts, one 
can assume that cost overruns for fixed price contracts improved after the treatment date 
of December 31, 1997.  See Table 7 for a complete summary of the results for this 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis #6 
Normality for the samples corresponding to Hypothesis #6 is tested both visually 
and quantitatively.  The visual test is accomplished by using a normal probability plot.  
Figures 18 and 19 in Appendix A show the normal probability plots associated with 
Hypothesis #6.  Figure 18 is constructed using the pre-1997 cost reimbursable contracts, 
and Figure 19 is constructed using the post-1997 cost reimbursable contracts.  As one can 
see, the plots do not yield straight lines, so it is likely that these two samples are not 
normally distributed.  The quantitative test for normality, the Shapiro-Wilk test, yields 
test statistics of 0.756 and 0.941 and p-values of less than 0.0001 and 0.0105, 
respectively.  Since the p-values for these two samples are less than the alpha of 0.05, this 
confirms that these samples do not come from normally distributed populations.  See 
Table 7 for a summary of the tests for normality. 
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The modified Levene test, which is the test for equal variances, yields a test 
statistic of 15.5955 and a p-value of 0.0001.  Since the p-value is less than the 0.05 level 
of significance, it can be assumed that these samples do not have constant variance.  See 
Table 7 for a summary of the tests for constant variance. 
Even though the assumption of normality is violated with these two samples, the 
Central Limit Theorem allows for the two sample t-test to be used to test this hypothesis.  
Since the samples do not have constant variance, the Welch ANOVA test is also 
performed to validate the results of the t-test.  Using the two sample t-test to test that the 
mean of the first sample is equal to the mean of the second sample yields a test statistic of 
3.582 and a p-value of 0.0005.  The Welch ANOVA test supports these results with a test 
statistic of 14.016 and a p-value of 0.0003.  Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected and 
one can assume that the mean final overrun percentage of the pre-1997 cost reimbursable 
contracts is not equal to the mean final overrun percentage of the post-1997 cost 
reimbursable contracts.  Since the mean final overrun percentage of the post-1997 cost 
reimbursable contracts is better than the mean final overrun percentage of the pre-1997 
cost reimbursable contracts, one can assume that cost overruns for cost reimbursable 
contracts improved after the treatment date of December 31, 1997.  See Table 7 for a 
complete summary of the results for this hypothesis. 
 
 49
Table 7.  Statistical Analysis Summary  
Hypothesis 1 Total Population of Contracts     
Sample 1: Total Pre-1997 Contracts: 107 values ranging from -134.82 to 22.04 
Sample 2: Total Post-1997 Contracts: 113 values ranging from -48.87 to 25.96 
            
    Sample 1 Sample 2     
  Shapiro-Wilk 0.806 0.944     
  p-value 0 0.0002     
  Mean FO% -11.79 0.85     
  Standard Deviation 27.83 13.17     
            
  Modified Levene 26.945       
  p-value 0.0001       
            
    Test Statistic p-value     
  Two Sample t-test 4.345 0.0001     
  Welch ANOVA 4.271 0.0001     
  Wilcoxon Signed Rank -3.393 0.0007     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 2 Development Contracts     
Sample 1: Pre-1997 Development Contracts: 41 values ranging from -134.82 to 22.04 
Sample 2: Post-1997 Development Contracts: 64 values ranging from -48.87 to 22.68 
            
    Sample 1 Sample 2     
  Shapiro-Wilk 0.823 0.925     
  p-value 0.0001 0.0007     
  Mean FO% -18.86 -0.29     
  Standard Deviation 31.89 13.89     
            
  Modified Levene 17.186       
  p-value 0.0001       
            
    Test Statistic p-value     
  Two Sample t-test 4.098 0.0001     
  Welch ANOVA 3.52 0.0009     
  Wilcoxon Signed Rank -3.445 0.0006     
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Hypothesis 3 Production Contracts     
Sample 1: Pre-1997 Production Contracts: 66 values ranging from -96.88 to 20.81 
Sample 2: Post-1997 Production Contracts: 49 values ranging from -32.71 to 25.96 
            
    Sample 1 Sample 2     
  Shapiro-Wilk 0.79 0.962     
  p-value 0.0001 0.1941     
  Mean FO% -7.39 2.36     
  Standard Deviation 24.21 12.13     
            
  Modified Levene 9.4562       
  p-value 0.0026       
            
    Test Statistic p-value     
  Two Sample t-test 2.588 0.0109     
  Welch ANOVA 2.831 0.0056     
  Wilcoxon Signed Rank 1.971 0.0487     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 4.1 Army Contracts     
Sample 1: Pre-1997 Army Contracts: 19 values ranging from -134.82 to 7.76 
Sample 2: Post-1997 Army Contracts: 28 values ranging from -48.87 to 23.29 
            
    Sample 1 Sample 2     
  Shapiro-Wilk 0.707 0.908     
  p-value 0.0001 0.0189     
  Mean FO% -18.42 0.86     
  Standard Deviation 33.47 17.25     
            
  Modified Levene 3.679       
  p-value 0.0614       
            
    Test Statistic p-value     
  Two Sample t-test 2.591 0.0128     
  Welch ANOVA 2.311 0.0295     
  Wilcoxon Signed Rank -2.265 0.0235     
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Hypothesis 4.2 Navy Contracts     
Sample 1: Pre-1997 Navy Contracts: 47 values ranging from -94.84 to 20.63 
Sample 2: Post-1997 Navy Contracts: 58 values ranging from -32.71 to 25.96 
            
    Sample 1 Sample 2     
  Shapiro-Wilk 0.857 0.951     
  p-value 0.0001 0.0384     
  Mean FO% -13.33 0.52     
  Standard Deviation 26.82 11.07     
            
  Modified Levene 21.997       
  p-value 0.0001       
            
    Test Statistic p-value     
  Two Sample t-test 3.578 0.0005     
  Welch ANOVA 3.319 0.0016     
  Wilcoxon Signed Rank -2.678 0.0074     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 4.3 Air Force Contracts     
Sample 1: Pre-1997 Air Force Contracts: 41 values ranging from -97.36 to 22.04 
Sample 2: Post-1997 Air Force Contracts: 27 values ranging from -31.91 to 24.52 
            
    Sample 1 Sample 2     
  Shapiro-Wilk 0.75 0.936     
  p-value 0.0001 0.1043     
  Mean FO% -6.95 1.58     
  Standard Deviation 25.96 12.97     
            
  Modified Levene 4.469       
  p-value 0.0383       
            
    Test Statistic p-value     
  Two Sample t-test 1.58 0.1188     
  Welch ANOVA 1.793 0.0779     
  Wilcoxon Signed Rank 1.128 0.2593     
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Hypothesis 5 Fixed Price Contracts     
Sample 1: Pre-1997 Fixed Price Contracts: 39 values ranging from -46.99 to 22.04 
Sample 2: Post-1997 Fixed Price Contracts: 54 values ranging from -37.17 to 22.68 
            
    Sample 1 Sample 2     
  Shapiro-Wilk 0.914 0.934     
  p-value 0.0060 0.0074     
  Mean FO% -7.85 0.30     
  Standard Deviation 20.23 13.00     
            
  Modified Levene 15.872       
  p-value 0.0001       
            
    
Test 
Statistic p-value     
  Two Sample t-test 2.364 0.0202     
  Welch ANOVA 2.209 0.0310     
  Wilcoxon Signed Rank -1.491 0.1360     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 6 Cost Reimbursable 
Contracts     
Sample 1: Pre-1997 Cost Reimbursable Contracts: 67 values ranging from -134.82 to 20.63 
Sample 2: Post-1997 Cost Reimbursable Contracts: 59 values ranging from -48.87 to 25.96 
            
    Sample 1 Sample 2     
  Shapiro-Wilk 0.756 0.941     
  p-value 0.0001 0.0105     
  Mean FO% -14.40 1.37     
  Standard Deviation 31.39 13.41     
            
  Modified Levene 15.596       
  p-value 0.0001       
            
    Test Statistic p-value     
  Two Sample t-test 3.582 0.0005     
  Welch ANOVA 3.744 0.0003     
  Wilcoxon Signed Rank 3.036 0.0024     
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V.  Conclusions 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter discusses the findings of this research along with the potential impact 
of those findings to the DoD.  It begins with a restatement of the research questions 
followed by a discussion relating the results of the hypothesis tests to the research 
questions.  Then, some limitations of the research are presented with a discussion of how 
the limitations affect the interpretation of the results.  The chapter concludes with some 
suggestions for future research that would complement this study. 
Research Questions 
Recall that the purpose of this study was to determine what effect the Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) and the Clinger-Cohen Act had on cost overruns in 
DoD contracts.  Specifically, did cost overruns improve, worsen or stay the same after the 
implementation of the FASA and the Clinger-Cohen Act?  To make this determination, 
the following research questions were posed: 
1. Is the final cost overrun percentage on contracts completed after the 
implementation of the FASA and Clinger-Cohen Act equal to the final cost 
overrun percentage on contracts completed before the implementation of the 
FASA and Clinger-Cohen Act? 
2. Is the final cost overrun percentage sensitive to the phase of the acquisition life 
cycle the program is in? 
3. Is the final cost overrun percentage sensitive to the branch of service responsible 
for the program? 
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4. Is the final overrun percentage sensitive to the type of contract? 
The results of the hypothesis tests suggest that the FASA and Clinger-Cohen Act have 
had a positive impact on cost overruns within DoD programs.  So, to answer the first 
research question, the final cost overrun percentage has improved for DoD contracts after 
the implementation of the FASA and the Clinger-Cohen Act.  This suggests that 
Congress and DoD leadership have made some effective strides with current acquisition 
reform initiatives.   
The second research question is aimed at determining if the improvements in cost 
overruns are sensitive to the phase of the acquisition lifecycle.  The results indicate that 
cost overruns have improved in both development and production contracts since the 
implementation of the FASA and the Clinger-Cohen Act.  Thus, the improvements are 
not sensitive to the phase of the acquisition lifecycle.  This effect of the FASA and the 
Clinger-Cohen Act is contrary to how the Packard Commission’s recommendations 
affected cost overruns.  The Packard Commission recommendations contributed to an 
increase in cost overruns for development contracts while cost overruns in production 
contracts experienced no change (Searle, 1997: 72). 
The third research question addressed whether the improvements in cost overruns 
are sensitive to the branch of service responsible for the contract.  The results show that 
cost overruns improved in both Army and Navy contracts.  Air Force contracts, however, 
did not change enough to conclude with confidence that the populations are statistically 
different.  Therefore, the FASA and the Clinger-Cohen Act affected no change on Air 
Force contracts. 
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The fourth research question asks whether or not the improvement in cost 
overruns is sensitive to the type of contract.  The results show that cost overruns for fixed 
price and cost reimbursable contracts improved after the implementation of the FASA 
and Clinger-Cohen Act.  Therefore, the improvement in cost overruns is not sensitive to 
the type of contract, which implies that policy changes specific to contract type is not 
necessary. 
Limitations 
Before the conclusions are used for any decision making, there are four important 
limitations that must be considered.  First, the treatment date of December 31, 1997 may 
not reflect the full implementation of the FASA and the Clinger-Cohen Act.  This date 
was selected based on past research and the expert opinion of acquisition professionals.  
Since the selection process was not scientific, a date other than the one selected could 
better represent the implementation of the two acts.  Further analysis would determine if 
the results are sensitive to slight changes in the treatment date. 
The second limitation involves the contracts contained in the DAES database.  
There are times when contracts are cancelled for various reasons, poor cost performance 
not withstanding.  Using contracts that are 75% complete excludes those contracts that 
were cancelled before the 75% completion point.  Including those contracts could yield 
different results.  More information is necessary to establish which contracts were 
cancelled and to ascertain whether this limitation had a pivotal effect on the results. 
Linking the acquisition reform initiatives to the cost performance of DoD 
contracts is the third limitation of this study.  The decrease in cost overruns noted in the 
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results of this study may in fact be coincidental.  The assumption is that the FASA and 
Clinger-Cohen Act caused the decrease in cost overruns.  However, without a more 
rigorous statistical analysis, this cause and effect can only be assumed. 
The final limitation of this study is the inability of it to capture cost savings in 
DoD acquisitions.  Reducing the cost at which the government is able to procure items is 
considered a positive impact of acquisition reform initiatives.  Since many of these cost 
savings occur prior to the awarding of the contract, the savings are not immediately 
discernible.  To quantify this impact, one would have to look at contracts on similar items 
before and after the treatment date to see if the cost per item decreased.  This limitation is 
very important in how the results are interpreted.  For example, if the Air Force had 
plentiful cost savings that were not captured in the final overrun percentages, then it is 
possible that the FASA and the Clinger-Cohen Act led to those cost savings.  Therefore, 
the impact of the FASA and Clinger-Cohen Act may be much greater than the change in 
the final overrun percentage indicates. 
Recommended Future Research 
Since this research indicates that the FASA and the Clinger-Cohen Act 
contributed to the reduction of cost overruns on DoD acquisitions, any future research 
that strengthens those assertions would greatly benefit this study.  This section outlines 
three areas of recommended research that could increase the confidence in the results of 
this analysis. 
First, there is an indication that a different methodology yields different results.  
Similar research was accomplished using an alternate definition of cost variance.   Using 
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the same treatment date, Captain Mark Holbrook used the following equation to calculate 
the final cost overrun percentage: 
ACWP – BCWP 
BCWP 
His conclusion was that current acquisition reform had no effect on the final cost 
overrun percentage of DoD contracts.  Since this conclusion is contrary to the results 
shown in this research, further analysis would benefit both Capt Holbrook’s research and 
this research.  A comparison of both methods used to calculate cost overruns would 
determine which method is more appropriate.  The results of a comparative analysis 
would profoundly impact how these two efforts are interpreted.   
The second area of recommended research is to subject some of the constraints of 
this research to a sensitivity analysis to determine if slight shifts in the methodology yield 
different results.  Two constraints that are suited for a sensitivity analysis are the dates 
used to capture the impact of the FASA and the Clinger-Cohen Act and the percentage 
completion of the contracts.  A combination of dates with varying pivot dates should be 
analyzed and compared to see how sensitive the results are to the selected dates.  
Graphing the changes in the final cost overrun percentages would give further insight into 
how long acquisition reform legislation takes to impact the DoD procurement process.  
The results of this analysis hinge on the 75% completion point being accurate.  As stated 
previously, this completion point was used because past research has shown that the 
majority of costs are incurred at this point and the contract can be considered complete in 
terms of cost (Searle, 1997: 41).  Testing contract completion percentages greater than 
75% would show whether cost overruns worsen, improve or stay the same after the 75% 
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completion point.  Drastic changes in the cost overrun percentage after the 75% 
completion point could contradict the results of this effort. 
The third area of recommended research would give deeper insight into the 
Clinger-Cohen Act.  Sandra Meckley believes that much of the impact of the Clinger-
Cohen Act is just now being felt (Meckley, 2002).  This could be due to the increased 
emphasis on Information Technology (IT) resources in recent years.  To determine the 
validity of Ms. Meckley’s assumption, one would need to isolate the contracts dealing 
with IT resources and perform a hypothesis test with only those contracts using a more 
recent treatment date. 
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Normal Probability Plots 
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Figure 4.  Normal Probability Plot (Pre-1997 Contracts) 
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Figure 5.  Normal Probability Plot (Post-1997 Contracts) 
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Figure 6.  Normal Probability Plot (Pre-1997 Development Contracts) 
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Figure 7.  Normal Probability Plot (Post-1997 Development Contracts) 
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Figure 8.  Normal Probability Plot (Pre-1997 Production Contracts) 
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Figure 9.  Normal Probability Plot (Post-1997 Production Contracts) 
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Figure 10.  Normal Probability Plot (Pre-1997 Army Contracts) 
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Figure 11.  Normal Probability Plot (Post-1997 Army Contracts) 
 
 64
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Z Score
O
bs
er
va
tio
n
 
Figure 12.  Normal Probability Plot (Pre-1997 Navy Contracts) 
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Figure 13.  Normal Probability Plot (Post-1997 Navy Contracts) 
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Figure 14.  Normal Probability Plot (Pre-1997 Air Force Contracts) 
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Figure 15.  Normal Probability Plot (Post-1997 Air Force Contracts) 
 
 
 
 66
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Z Score
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 
Figure 16. Normal Probability Plot (Pre-1997 Fixed Price Contracts) 
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Figure 17. Normal Probability Plot (Post-1997 Fixed Price Contracts) 
 
 67
-1.6
-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Z Score
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 
Figure 18. Normal Probability Plot (Pre-1997 Cost Reimbursable Contracts) 
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Figure 19. Normal Probability Plot (Post-1997 Cost Reimbursable Contracts) 
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Appendix B 
Data Table For Contracts Used In This Study 
 
 
SUBMITDATE SERVICE PPHASE CTYPE BAC ACWP FO FO% %COMP 
1/25/1994 Navy Production CR 108.8 109.4 -0.6 -0.55147 99.26471
1/25/1994 Navy R&D CR 40.7 79.3 -38.6 -94.8403 199.7543
3/25/1994 Navy Production CR 83.8 139 -55.2 -65.8711 99.40334
4/25/1994 Navy Production CR 1019.4 1004 15.4 1.510693 98.22445
5/25/1994 Army R&D FP 14.7 21.3 -6.6 -44.898 125.1701
5/25/1994 Air Force R&D CR 873.9 1088.5 -214.6 -24.5566 124.4536
7/25/1994 Navy Production CR 1158.4 1440.6 -282.2 -24.3612 97.6692
7/25/1994 Navy Production CR 998.8 900.9 97.9 9.801762 79.72567
7/25/1994 Navy Production FP 787 635.1 151.9 19.30114 77.19187
7/25/1994 Army R&D CR 76.5 84.6 -8.1 -10.5882 94.24837
8/25/1994 Air Force Production CR 309.3 289.9 19.4 6.272228 97.51051
8/25/1994 Navy Production CR 551.3 721.6 -170.3 -30.8906 117.0143
8/25/1994 Navy Production FP 163.8 142.4 21.4 13.06471 95.116
8/25/1994 Navy Production CR 49 77 -28 -57.1429 132.8571
9/25/1994 Air Force Production CR 134 114.8 19.2 14.32836 90.89552
10/25/1994 Air Force Production CR 897.3 1147 -249.7 -27.8279 106.7982
10/25/1994 Air Force Production CR 945.3 984.5 -39.2 -4.14683 95.10208
10/25/1994 Navy Production CR 248.9 329.1 -80.2 -32.2218 117.5573
11/25/1994 Navy Production FP 491 441.7 49.3 10.04073 95.21385
12/25/1994 Air Force Production CR 238.8 239.6 -0.8 -0.33501 97.52931
12/25/1994 Air Force Production CR 756.1 764 -7.9 -1.04484 96.21743
12/25/1994 Air Force Production CR 611.6 638.5 -26.9 -4.3983 89.99346
12/25/1994 Air Force Production FP 180.8 165.5 15.3 8.462389 82.68805
12/25/1994 Air Force Production CR 1447.7 1478.5 -30.8 -2.12751 94.77792
12/25/1994 Air Force Production FP 881 993.6 -112.6 -12.7809 98.29739
12/25/1994 Air Force R&D CR 215.1 224.4 -9.3 -4.32357 104.7885
1/25/1995 Navy Production CR 1095.3 1067.7 27.6 2.519858 97.00539
2/25/1995 Navy Production FP 853.8 816 37.8 4.427266 90.68869
2/25/1995 Air Force R&D CR 86.1 75.7 10.4 12.07898 90.82462
3/25/1995 Navy Production CR 287.8 500.4 -212.6 -73.8707 155.9764
3/25/1995 Navy Production CR 117.3 93.1 24.2 20.63086 78.34612
3/25/1995 Army R&D CR 44.6 50.9 -6.3 -14.1256 110.3139
4/25/1995 Air Force Production CR 165.7 167.1 -1.4 -0.8449 97.40495
4/25/1995 Air Force Production CR 19.5 16.4 3.1 15.89744 100
4/25/1995 Navy Production FP 228 293.1 -65.1 -28.5526 118.7719
5/25/1995 Army R&D FP 285.2 282.5 2.7 0.946704 98.10659
6/25/1995 Army R&D CR 72.8 98.9 -26.1 -35.8516 98.48901
6/25/1995 Navy R&D FP 485.5 672.7 -187.2 -38.5582 98.4758
7/25/1995 Air Force Production CR 102.7 102.2 0.5 0.486855 99.22103
7/25/1995 Air Force Production CR 1406.1 1400.9 5.2 0.369817 97.47529
8/25/1995 Navy Production CR 65.8 122.8 -57 -86.6261 168.693
8/25/1995 Navy Production CR 66.6 70.9 -4.3 -6.45646 89.33934
8/25/1995 Army R&D CR 93.8 93.7 0.1 0.10661 97.8678
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SUBMITDATE SERVICE PPHASE CTYPE BAC ACWP FO FO% %COMP 
8/25/1995 Navy R&D FP 127.7 183.8 -56.1 -43.9311 130.0705
9/25/1995 Army Production CR 373.1 345.4 27.7 7.424283 90.37791
9/25/1995 Navy Production CR 264.6 250.6 14 5.291005 93.68859
9/25/1995 Army R&D CR 34.3 49.9 -15.6 -45.481 140.2332
9/25/1995 Army R&D CR 29 28.7 0.3 1.034483 99.31034
10/25/1995 Army Production CR 236.4 312.3 -75.9 -32.1066 119.797
10/25/1995 Air Force R&D FP 89.3 77.7 11.6 12.98992 95.85666
10/25/1995 Navy R&D CR 24.2 22.7 1.5 6.198347 90.90909
10/25/1995 Navy R&D FP 386.3 490.9 -104.6 -27.0774 97.54077
11/25/1995 Air Force Production CR 116.1 110.6 5.5 4.737295 99.05254
11/25/1995 Navy Production  526.8 475.2 51.6 9.794989 97.03872
12/25/1995 Air Force R&D FP 157.8 228.4 -70.6 -44.7402 98.73257
1/25/1996 Air Force R&D FP 5547.9 8154.7 -2606.8 -46.9871 93.41012
2/25/1996 Air Force R&D CR 89 110 -21 -23.5955 94.26966
3/25/1996 Navy Production FP 57.6 65.5 -7.9 -13.7153 100.6944
4/25/1996 Air Force Production CR 632 640.1 -8.1 -1.28165 93.03797
4/25/1996 Navy Production FP 659.5 628.5 31 4.700531 97.04321
4/25/1996 Air Force R&D FP 95.8 125.5 -29.7 -31.0021 96.55532
4/25/1996 Navy R&D FP 118.9 123.9 -5 -4.20521 94.0286
5/25/1996 Navy Production CR 1099.8 1089.4 10.4 0.945626 106.6285
5/25/1996 Navy Production CR 965.9 1009.6 -43.7 -4.52428 100.1242
5/25/1996 Army R&D FP 424.1 418.5 5.6 1.320443 98.5145
6/25/1996 Army Production FP 58.3 56.8 1.5 2.572899 98.11321
6/25/1996 Army Production FP 43.8 40.4 3.4 7.762557 94.97717
6/25/1996 Navy Production FP 563 531.1 31.9 5.666075 95.13321
6/25/1996 Navy R&D FP 953 1118.6 -165.6 -17.3767 113.6516
7/25/1996 Air Force Production FP 1421.2 1382.7 38.5 2.708978 97.55137
7/25/1996 Air Force R&D CR 10514.3 9751.9 762.4 7.251077 88.23507
7/25/1996 Navy R&D FP 17.1 17.7 -0.6 -3.50877 95.90643
8/25/1996 Army R&D CR 199.6 468.7 -269.1 -134.82 224.7495
8/25/1996 Air Force R&D CR 735.3 722.8 12.5 1.699986 96.40963
9/25/1996 Navy R&D CR 68.5 60.9 7.6 11.09489 88.90511
10/25/1996 Air Force R&D CR 76.2 73.7 2.5 3.28084 97.50656
10/25/1996 Air Force R&D CR 77.2 77.1 0.1 0.129534 99.6114
10/25/1996 Navy R&D CR 97.6 97.7 -0.1 -0.10246 94.97951
11/25/1996 Air Force Production CR 92 102.7 -10.7 -11.6304 100.2174
11/25/1996 Navy Production CR 1911 1936.4 -25.4 -1.32915 104.652
12/25/1996 Air Force Production CR 11779.5 10895.7 883.8 7.502865 93.06592
12/25/1996 Air Force R&D CR 10014.8 19765.1 -9750.3 -97.3589 196.7997
12/25/1996 Navy R&D CR 21.9 25.4 -3.5 -15.9817 100
12/25/1996 Navy R&D CR 24.1 27.6 -3.5 -14.5228 100.4149
1/25/1997 Navy R&D CR 127.8 132.3 -4.5 -3.52113 94.2097
2/25/1997 Air Force Production CR 80.2 157.9 -77.7 -96.8828 110.0998
2/25/1997 Navy Production CR 104.6 119.6 -15 -14.3403 106.5966
2/25/1997 Army R&D CR 149.6 172.6 -23 -15.3743 97.59358
4/25/1997 Navy Production CR 520.6 488.9 31.7 6.089128 94.98655
5/25/1997 Army Production CR 189.3 199.6 -10.3 -5.4411 97.14739
5/25/1997 Navy Production CR 512.7 444.4 68.3 13.32163 92.90033
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SUBMITDATE SERVICE PPHASE CTYPE BAC ACWP FO FO% %COMP 
5/25/1997 Navy Production CR 706.2 767.8 -61.6 -8.72274 108.5811
6/25/1997 Army R&D CR 122.5 123.6 -1.1 -0.89796 90.44898
7/25/1997 Navy Production FP 561 648.6 -87.6 -15.615 100
7/25/1997 Navy Production FP 329.1 327.1 2 0.607718 91.46156
8/25/1997 Air Force Production CR 94.8 89.2 5.6 5.907173 98.10127
8/25/1997 Air Force Production FP 70 66.3 3.7 5.285714 99.14286
8/25/1997 Air Force Production FP 39.3 39.9 -0.6 -1.52672 99.49109
8/25/1997 Air Force R&D FP 109.8 85.6 24.2 22.04007 95.81056
9/25/1997 Navy Production FP 1060.4 1346.6 -286.2 -26.9898 105.7243
10/25/1997 Air Force Production FP 500.6 424 76.6 15.30164 96.1646
10/25/1997 Air Force Production FP 228.3 180.8 47.5 20.80596 77.48576
11/25/1997 Army Production FP 26.3 35.8 -9.5 -36.1217 86.69202
11/25/1997 Army Production FP 157 149.7 7.3 4.649682 93.63057
11/25/1997 Air Force R&D FP 255.6 302.5 -46.9 -18.349 98.90454
11/25/1997 Air Force R&D FP 85.9 83.1 2.8 3.259604 95.57625
12/25/1997 Navy Production FP 676.5 786.4 -109.9 -16.2454 114.8263
1/25/1998 Navy Production FP 632.9 818.2 -185.3 -29.2779 100.632
3/25/1998 Army R&D FP 120.2 137.2 -17 -14.1431 97.33777
3/25/1998 Navy R&D FP 60.9 78 -17.1 -28.0788 98.02956
4/25/1998 Army Production FP 219.2 177.5 41.7 19.02372 77.82847
4/25/1998 Navy Production FP 382.2 323.5 58.7 15.35845 89.76975
5/25/1998 Army R&D FP 46.5 48.8 -2.3 -4.94624 99.78495
5/25/1998 Navy R&D FP 233.9 208.2 25.7 10.9876 84.95083
7/25/1998 Army R&D FP 55.5 63.1 -7.6 -13.6937 98.91892
7/25/1998 Army R&D FP 442.8 446.5 -3.7 -0.83559 95.16712
8/25/1998 Army Production CR 10.9 9.2 1.7 15.59633 86.23853
8/25/1998 Navy Production FP 552.4 534.9 17.5 3.167994 97.4294
9/25/1998 Navy Production FP 843.9 919 -75.1 -8.89916 95.94739
9/25/1998 Army R&D FP 113.7 99.2 14.5 12.75286 86.45558
10/25/1998 Navy Production FP 3188.5 3267.6 -79.1 -2.48079 98.96817
11/25/1998 Army Production CR 243 215.8 27.2 11.19342 91.15226
11/25/1998 Air Force Production CR 246.8 264.8 -18 -7.29335 98.2577
11/25/1998 Air Force Production CR 129.4 131.9 -2.5 -1.93199 101.4683
11/25/1998 Air Force Production CR 421.9 498.1 -76.2 -18.0612 117.0894
11/25/1998 Navy Production CR 131.5 136.3 -4.8 -3.65019 94.60076
11/25/1998 Navy Production FP 283.7 250.5 33.2 11.7025 90.51815
2/25/1999 Navy Production CR 683.1 781.9 -98.8 -14.4635 116.1323
2/25/1999 Navy R&D CR 386.9 411.6 -24.7 -6.38408 98.13905
3/25/1999 Army R&D CR 75.8 77.2 -1.4 -1.84697 94.19525
5/25/1999 Army R&D FP 536 598.2 -62.2 -11.6045 99.16045
5/25/1999 Navy R&D FP 300.8 335.7 -34.9 -11.6024 105.0532
6/25/1999 Army R&D CR 249.5 276.3 -26.8 -10.7415 110.7415
7/25/1999 Air Force R&D CR 388.3 388.2 0.1 0.025753 98.50631
8/25/1999 Air Force R&D CR 106.7 102.7 4 3.748828 96.15745
11/25/1999 Army R&D FP 118.4 114.3 4.1 3.462838 96.28378
12/25/1999 Navy R&D CR 244.7 267.7 -23 -9.39926 99.95913
2/25/2000 Air Force R&D CR 130.6 110.3 20.3 15.54364 84.76263
3/25/2000 Air Force R&D CR 289.9 265.8 24.1 8.313211 89.92756
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4/25/2000 Navy Production CR 214.3 199.8 14.5 6.766216 96.82688
5/25/2000 Navy R&D FP 26.7 27 -0.3 -1.1236 98.12734
5/25/2000 Navy R&D CR 407.5 438.7 -31.2 -7.65644 91.0184
6/25/2000 Army R&D CR 1420 2114 -694 -48.8732 144.5141
6/25/2000 Navy R&D CR 25.8 26.4 -0.6 -2.32558 93.02326
7/25/2000 Army Production CR 3413.3 2618.2 795.1 23.29417 76.76149
7/25/2000 Army R&D CR 254.5 280 -25.5 -10.0196 98.54617
7/25/2000 Air Force R&D CR 77.1 101.7 -24.6 -31.9066 95.33074
8/25/2000 Air Force Production CR 668.9 730.9 -62 -9.26895 112.528
8/25/2000 Navy Production CR 72.1 68.3 3.8 5.270458 99.58391
8/25/2000 Air Force R&D CR 76.9 98.7 -21.8 -28.3485 120.2861
9/25/2000 Navy Production CR 689.5 618.8 70.7 10.25381 95.27194
9/25/2000 Air Force Production CR 58.3 56.1 2.2 3.773585 95.02573
9/25/2000 Navy R&D FP 25.8 28.1 -2.3 -8.91473 98.83721
11/25/2000 Navy Production FP 879.5 1019.4 -139.9 -15.9068 97.55543
11/25/2000 Navy Production FP 314.6 285.9 28.7 9.122695 94.56453
11/25/2000 Navy R&D CR 40.8 40.8 0 0 100
1/25/2001 Navy Production CR 1567.4 1518.1 49.3 3.145336 97.37782
1/25/2001 Navy Production CR 225.3 223.3 2 0.887705 98.57967
1/25/2001 Navy R&D CR 3420.8 3441.1 -20.3 -0.59343 99.58197
1/25/2001 Navy R&D CR 674.8 738.1 -63.3 -9.38056 100.0741
2/25/2001 Navy Production FP 924.1 975.9 -51.8 -5.60545 92.20864
2/25/2001 Navy Production CR 44.7 50.6 -5.9 -13.1991 90.82774
2/25/2001 Air Force Production CR 464.1 488.3 -24.2 -5.21439 106.2487
4/25/2001 Navy Production FP 160.5 213 -52.5 -32.7103 123.8629
5/25/2001 Air Force R&D FP 85.3 71.2 14.1 16.52989 83.47011
5/25/2001 Navy R&D FP 166.6 163.5 3.1 1.860744 94.41777
7/25/2001 Navy Production FP 17.3 16.6 0.7 4.046243 78.03468
7/25/2001 Navy Production FP 616.7 597.1 19.6 3.178207 95.83266
8/25/2001 Army R&D FP 169.5 176.5 -7 -4.12979 97.40413
8/25/2001 Army R&D FP 73.9 82.5 -8.6 -11.6373 97.29364
9/25/2001 Air Force R&D FP 3524.2 3287.4 236.8 6.719255 95.30106
10/25/2001 Air Force Production FP 395.7 392.2 3.5 0.884508 95.42583
10/25/2001 Navy Production CR 42.3 39.5 2.8 6.619385 94.56265
10/25/2001 Navy Production CR 481.7 454.3 27.4 5.688188 96.49159
10/25/2001 Navy Production CR 520.6 474.8 45.8 8.797541 92.1821
10/25/2001 Navy Production CR 460.9 428.5 32.4 7.029724 88.17531
10/25/2001 Navy Production CR 1321.9 1350 -28.1 -2.12573 97.99531
10/25/2001 Navy Production CR 1660.6 1715.3 -54.7 -3.29399 96.24834
10/25/2001 Navy Production CR 1382.8 1225.5 157.3 11.37547 79.98988
10/25/2001 Navy Production FP 2331.9 2037.4 294.5 12.62919 80.63811
10/25/2001 Air Force Production FP 75.6 77.7 -2.1 -2.77778 96.42857
10/25/2001 Air Force Production FP 263.3 257 6.3 2.392708 93.96126
10/25/2001 Navy Production FP 1602.6 1465.1 137.5 8.579808 95.51354
10/25/2001 Army R&D FP 616.7 488.1 128.6 20.85293 79.63353
10/25/2001 Army R&D FP 171.8 169.9 1.9 1.105937 98.83586
10/25/2001 Army R&D FP 69.4 71.1 -1.7 -2.44957 86.02305
10/25/2001 Air Force R&D CR 82.9 84.8 -1.9 -2.29192 100.7238
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SUBMITDATE SERVICE PPHASE CTYPE BAC ACWP FO FO% %COMP 
10/25/2001 Air Force R&D CR 539 444.7 94.3 17.49536 81.05751
10/25/2001 Air Force R&D FP 101.8 100 1.8 1.768173 98.91945
10/25/2001 Navy R&D FP 3150.3 3121.3 29 0.920547 97.52405
10/25/2001 Navy R&D FP 525.3 512.8 12.5 2.379593 96.24976
11/25/2001 Army Production CR 124.4 109.5 14.9 11.97749 80.54662
11/25/2001 Air Force Production CR 220.7 198.5 22.2 10.0589 92.75034
11/25/2001 Air Force Production CR 351.9 265.6 86.3 24.52401 83.74538
11/25/2001 Navy Production FP 919.8 854.2 65.6 7.131985 86.93194
11/25/2001 Navy Production FP 1011.8 988.7 23.1 2.28306 89.97826
11/25/2001 Navy Production FP 139.7 139.6 0.1 0.071582 97.56621
11/25/2001 Army R&D FP 672.8 922.9 -250.1 -37.173 129.3847
11/25/2001 Army R&D FP 166.9 142.7 24.2 14.4997 86.51887
11/25/2001 Army R&D FP 41 31.7 9.3 22.68293 77.80488
11/25/2001 Army R&D FP 135.4 110.9 24.5 18.09453 81.0192
11/25/2001 Air Force R&D CR 182 170.4 11.6 6.373626 93.46154
11/25/2001 Air Force R&D FP 331.5 280.9 50.6 15.26395 80.84465
11/25/2001 Navy R&D FP 148.7 146.7 2 1.34499 99.05851
11/25/2001 Navy R&D FP 196.9 185.2 11.7 5.942103 91.77247
11/25/2001 Navy R&D CR 106.7 88.5 18.2 17.05717 84.44236
11/25/2001 Navy R&D CR 307.1 322.1 -15 -4.8844 92.21752
11/25/2001 Navy R&D CR 514.3 527.2 -12.9 -2.50826 85.08653
11/25/2001 Navy R&D CR 16.1 14.4 1.7 10.55901 87.57764
11/25/2001 Navy R&D CR 66.2 59 7.2 10.87613 85.04532
11/25/2001 Navy R&D CR 126.1 104.6 21.5 17.04996 81.99841
11/25/2001 Navy R&D CR 138.8 133.7 5.1 3.674352 85.44669
12/25/2001 Navy Production CR 1161.7 860.1 301.6 25.96195 75.30343
12/25/2001 Army R&D CR 78.8 68.6 10.2 12.94416 90.22843
12/25/2001 Army R&D CR 210.6 188.7 21.9 10.39886 92.40266
12/25/2001 Army R&D CR 82.7 84 -1.3 -1.57195 96.85611
12/25/2001 Air Force R&D FP 13447 12842.8 604.2 4.493196 92.06143
12/25/2001 Air Force R&D FP 2198.6 2195.1 3.5 0.159192 98.20795
12/25/2001 Air Force R&D CR 396.1 349.4 46.7 11.78995 87.83136
12/25/2001 Navy R&D FP 285 276.7 8.3 2.912281 94.98246
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